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Deportation dominates immigration policy debates, yet it amounts to a fraction
of the work the immigration enforcement system does. This Article maps the interior
structure of immigration enforcement, and it seeks to show how attention to its
structure oﬀers both practical and conceptual payoﬀs for contemporary enforcement
debates. First, deportation should not be conceptualized as synonymous with
immigration enforcement; rather, it is merely the tip of a much larger enforcement
pyramid. At the pyramid’s base, immigration enforcement operates through a host of
initiatives that build immigration screening into common interactions, such as with
police and employers. Second, this enforcement structure has far-reaching hidden
costs. Scholars have recognized some of these costs, such as the exploitation of
undocumented noncitizens. Yet the full cost of this enforcement structure goes deeper.
Beyond enabling exploitative actors, it leaves little room for good faith actors to
incentivize socially valuable behavior. In its impact, immigration enforcement bears
unappreciated structural similarities to certain low-level criminal law enforcement
techniques, where a large population is likewise subject to ubiquitous monitoring by
public and private actors alike. As important criminal law and sociological literature
shows, this enforcement structure can carry far-reaching costs for society at large. It
can create system avoidance (where the regulated population avoids contact with key
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legal institutions) and law enforcement tradeoﬀs (where eﬀorts to enforce one law
result in underenforcement of other laws). This Article applies structural insights from
low-level criminal law enforcement to immigration enforcement to assess the costs of
monitoring an undocumented population long-term. It calls for restructuring
immigration enforcement to consider the full impact of interior enforcement in light
of those who remain present in the United States long term.
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INTRODUCTION
Deportation dominates immigration policy debates, yet it represents a
fraction of the work the immigration enforcement system does. In recent
years, federal immigration authorities have carried out three to four hundred
thousand removals annually.1 The numbers are staggering on a historic scale,
but they amount to no more than three to four percent of the estimated
population of eleven million undocumented migrants.2 The vast majority of
the undocumented population remains present long-term, with the median

1 U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2016 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND
REMOVALS
REPORT
2
(2016)
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/Report/2016/removal-stats-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YMG3-CQ34] (showing that annual removals in the past ten years ranged from
approximately 235,000 to 400,000 removals per year).
2 JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, OVERALL NUMBER OF U.S. UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANTS HOLDS STEADY SINCE 2009, at 3 (2016), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/7/2016/09/31170303/PH_2016.09.20_Unauthorized_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3ZL5-R539].
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length of residence being about fourteen years.3 Less than ﬁfteen percent
have been present for under ﬁve years.4
Given these figures, deportation plays an outsized role in immigration
policy debates.5 Equating immigration enforcement with deportation obscures
much of the interior work that the immigration enforcement system does. At
worst, it lends fodder to the argument that the immigration enforcement
system is simply not doing much work.6 It is akin to trying to understand the
whole of the criminal justice system from the perspective of capital cases.
A large literature explores how immigration enforcement has absorbed the
enforcement norms of criminal law.7 This scholarship is valuable precisely
because it illustrates the erosion of the doctrinal boundaries between
immigration and criminal law. Yet to the extent scholarship compares
deportation to criminal punishment, it presents an incomplete portrait of both
systems. Just as immigration enforcement does far more than impose
deportation, criminal law enforcement reaches well beyond formal punishment.
The vast majority of people who experience contact with the criminal justice
system do so through low-level arrests, where there is no hefty prison sentence.
Rather, they experience other penalties, such as probation, jail time, fines, lost
work, or other collateral penalties that can be triggered from a mere arrest, even
without a conviction. Incarceration is not the sum total of what the criminal
justice system does; it is merely the top of the “penal pyramid.” 8

Id. at 7.
See id. at 6 (using data from 2014 to arrive at this percentage).
This Article uses the statutory term “removal” interchangeably with “deportation.”
See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal
Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155, 156 (2008) (arguing that immigration policy does
“virtually nothing to enforce the law against garden-variety illegal aliens” and that “most illegal
aliens have never faced a serious threat of enforcement”); Joseph Tanfani, Atty. Gen. Sessions Says
Lax Immigration Enforcement Is Enabling Gangs Like MS-13, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2017),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-essential-washington-updates-sessions-sayslax-immigration-1492527375-htmlstory.html (describing immigration enforcement as lax for not
engaging in suﬃcient deportation).
7 The literature is far too voluminous to catalogue here. For selected contributions, see generally,
Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135 (2009);
Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281 (2010); Daniel
Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make
Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890 (2000); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration
Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003); David Alan Sklansky, Crime,
Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157 (2012); Juliet Stumpf, The
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006).
8 In employing this heuristic, I am indebted to Alexandra Natapoﬀ ’s insightful scholarship on
the “penal pyramid.” Alexandra Natapoﬀ, The Penal Pyramid, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE
THINKING 79 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoﬀ eds., 2017). Natapoﬀ ’s work criticizes the
dominance of felonies in criminal law scholarship and conceptualizes misdemeanors as the “base” of
the criminal justice system. Id.
3
4
5
6
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This Article argues that even as immigration enforcement has absorbed the
enforcement norms of federal criminal prosecution, it has also absorbed
surveillance and “managerial” techniques—namely, techniques for monitoring,
tracking, and conducting risk assessment on large groups over time—from the
low-level criminal law context. In comparing certain low-level criminal law
enforcement and immigration enforcement, this Article makes two contributions
to immigration enforcement debates. First, it argues that immigration
enforcement should not be conceptualized as synonymous with deportation;
rather, deportation is merely the tip of a much larger enforcement pyramid.
Scholars have explored the interconnections between the tips of the “penal
pyramid” and the immigration enforcement pyramid by showing how
deportation is imposed in ways that increasingly resemble criminal punishment.9
But they have yet to examine structural similarities at the base of both pyramids,
where a large population is subject to ongoing monitoring. This Article begins to
fill that gap. Second, it argues that similar to the misdemeanor context,
policymakers have failed to appreciate the hidden costs of monitoring a
population in the long term and creating the ubiquitous possibility of escalated
enforcement. A large and compelling body of literature documents how
immigration enforcement techniques may create vulnerability to bad or
unscrupulous actors, such as those who engage in wage theft or abuse.10 Yet the
real impact of this enforcement system goes deeper. It leaves little room for good
faith actors—those who do not seek to exploit vulnerable populations—to
encourage socially desirable interactions. Appreciating this cost is necessary for
understanding the full reach of immigration enforcement. It also suggests that
the costs of this enforcement approach are not entirely unique to the immigration
context. Rather, they are also partially the product of an enforcement structure
that gives a host of actors the power to trigger escalated enforcement.
Immigration enforcement operates in the interior by delegating
enforcement discretion to many actors, both public and private. Police oﬃcers
or employers, for instance, function as so-called “force multipliers” who are
supposed to engage in immigration enforcement while undertaking their
normal duties.11 In taking this approach, immigration enforcement borrows a
9 See id. at 72-73 (discussing how misdemeanors constitute the base of the “penal pyramid”
while felonies constitute the top and noting that the vast majority of criminal defendants experience
the criminal justice system through misdemeanors rather than felonies).
10 See, e.g., Elizabeth Fussell, The Deportation Threat Dynamic and Victimization of Latino
Migrants: Wage Theft and Robbery, 52 SOC. Q. 593, 601-604 (2011) (noting that Latino laborers in
New Orleans, Louisiana, from 2007 to 2008, of whom an estimated ninety percent were
undocumented, reported widespread wage theft).
11 See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police
to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181 (2005) (articulating the argument that police
ought to be used as immigration “force multipliers” to engage in interior immigration enforcement
and widen the enforcement “net”).
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strategy from low-level criminal law enforcement. Employers, for instance,
function as de facto probation oﬃcers when they monitor compliance with
work requirements for probationers. In thousands of homes that are subject
to “nuisance” ordinances around the country, landlords are required to
monitor tenants and to evict those the police suspect of causing
disturbances.12 In both the criminal law and immigration context, such
initiatives are viewed as a low-cost way to achieve enforcement objectives.
Yet taking this approach to enforcement imposes hidden costs. As criminal law
scholars have recognized, for one, some populations are unlikely to be deterred.
Some addicts, for instance, respond to drug enforcement crackdowns by engaging
in riskier behavior to avoid getting caught.13 Attempts at enforcement can trigger
law enforcement tradeoffs: They can come at the expense of enforcing other laws,
such as wage and hour laws. They can also lead to “system avoidance,” when the
regulated population avoids contact with key formal legal institutions to avoid
perceived surveillance and resulting enforcement actions.14 The volume of
undocumented migrants living in the United States long term demonstrates how
enforcement efforts are unable to meet their stated objectives. And efforts to
engage in ever-broader, ever-cheaper enforcement tactics are likely to create
significant costs for society at large, such as through system avoidance and law
enforcement tradeoffs. In taking this approach, interior immigration has
replicated some of the flawed assumptions behind low-level criminal enforcement,
particularly in overlooking the full costs of this approach.
Understanding the reach of immigration enforcement and its impact has
taken on new urgency in recent years. One rationale for the Trump
administration’s crackdown on illegal immigration is simple deterrence: the
theory is that high-profile acts of enforcement along with a stated “zero tolerance”
approach will make a significant dent in the population of eleven million
unauthorized migrants who are already present.15 This Article shows why this
See infra Part III for a discussion of these policies.
See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 786 (2008) (explaining
why drug courts adopt a flawed strategy by using penal techniques to motivate therapeutic behavior);
Jessica M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 595, 635 (2016) (discussing how
drug courts may not change underlying behavior); Barbara Fedders, Opioid Policing, 94 IND. L.J. 389,
404-09 (2019) (discussing the costs of criminalizing opioid use).
14 See Sarah Brayne, Surveillance and System Avoidance: Criminal Justice Contact and Institutional
Attachment, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 367, 368 (2014) (“[T]he potential of surveillance may lead to lower
levels of involvement in institutions that keep formal records . . . .”).
15 Deterrence is not the only rationale; as others have developed, the policy changes also reﬂect
obvious racial animus. See, e.g., Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting
Mexican
Immigrants
and
Crime,
WASH.
POST
(July
8,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-falsecomments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/?utm_term=.d335acee161d
[https://perma.cc/77BG-7RBU] (reporting that as a presidential candidate, Donald Trump described
Mexican migrants as “in many cases, criminals, drug dealers, rapists, etc.”); Laura Meckler &
12
13
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theory of deterrence is oversimplified. It overlooks systemic costs of attempting
to achieve deterrence, particularly costs associated with delegating enforcement
discretion to actors other than federal immigration enforcement authorities.
Undocumented migrants who remain in the United States are not merely
aware of the possibility that one day ICE may come knocking at their door.
Rather, they have reason to perceive routine interactions with key
institutions—employers, police, and others—as potential triggers for
detention, deportation, or other penalties. This awareness, in turn, creates
incentives to engage in system avoidance—to lay low, avoid reporting crime,
or avoid reporting unsafe working conditions. Awareness of surveillance
reorders relationships; it puts some in a position of power relative to others.
Employers, for instance, are not merely employers. Because they routinely
conduct immigration screening,16 they have the ability to credibly threaten to
trigger arrest, detention, or deportation. This raises the stakes of routine
interactions between undocumented workers and employers. Similar
dynamics unfold with others who exercise de facto immigration enforcement
power, such as police.17
Incentives to lay low exist even when employers or police themselves
encourage open communication, offer fair working conditions, or otherwise
encourage socially valuable interactions. This Article seeks to apply insights from
criminal law enforcement to evaluating how immigration enforcement decisions
affect the vast majority of undocumented migrants who remain within the United

Siobhan Hughes, Immigration Talks Muddled Amid Trump’s Vulgar Comments, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11,
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawmakers-look-to-sell-immigration-deal-to-a-skeptical-whitehouse-1515700909 (reporting that the President referred to Haitian and African immigrants as
coming from “shithole countries” and expressed a desire for more immigrants from countries like
Norway). My focus is structural not because the racism in immigration enforcement is unimportant
but rather because it has eloquently been discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Jayashri Srikantiah & Shirin
Sinnar, White Nationalism as Immigration Policy, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 197, 198-200 (2019)
(oﬀering multiple examples of President Trump denigrating nonwhite immigrants in racial terms).
In addition, while openly racialized rhetoric from a sitting president is deeply troubling, it is not an
entirely new development; immigration law has long reﬂected racial biases. See, e.g., Kari Hong, The
Absurdity of Crime-Based Deportation, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2067, 2071 (2017) (“The belief that
immigrants are crossing the border, in the stealth of night, with nefarious desires to bring violence,
crime, and drugs to the United States has long been part of the public imagination.”); Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., America’s Schizophrenic Immigration Policy: Race, Class, and Reason, 41 B.C. L. REV. 755,
761 (2000) (describing country caps as an example of racial biases that pervade legal immigration).
16 See Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1104-05
(2009) (conceptualizing private employers as “one particularly problematic set of immigration
screeners” given that they check immigration status and have the ability to report undocumented
workers who organize). For a discussion of the mechanics of employer screening, see infra Part II.
17 Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 559-71 (2013)
(conceptualizing prosecutors as “de facto immigration courts” because they exercise functional power
over deportation by deciding whether to bring pleas that will trigger deportation).

2019]

The Interior Structure of Immigration Enforcement

1469

States.18 It evaluates procedural reforms and “sanctuary” policies, and it considers
how to more fully assess the costs of the current enforcement structure.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly summarizes the literature
comparing deportation to criminal punishment. Part II explains why
deportation should be conceptualized as the tip of a larger enforcement
pyramid. Part III shows how immigration enforcement bears important
structural parallels to low-level criminal law enforcement techniques. Both
operate by delegating enforcement discretion to public and private actors, and
both carry the potential for high-stakes outcomes. It then discusses the costs
of seeking to surveil and to sporadically enforce laws against a long-term
undocumented population. Part IV considers how attention to the structure of
immigration enforcement may affect contemporary immigration enforcement
debates. In particular, it calls for recognizing the limits of proceduralist
arguments in immigration enforcement, and it evaluates the limits of
“sanctuary” policies in criminal justice. It also considers how to more fully
evaluate the costs of immigration enforcement in the absence of a legalization
program targeted toward the long-term undocumented population.
I. THE DEPORTATION-DOMINANT ACCOUNT
Immigration expansionists and restrictionists alike use removals as the most
important benchmark for understanding the reach of immigration enforcement.19
There are good reasons for this approach: deportation may be experienced as
punishment and imposed without adequate procedural constraints. This Part
briefly summarizes the key contributions of the deportation-centric approach,
including its comparison to punishment. Part II then turns to how interior
immigration enforcement is far broader than the act of removal.
As immigration scholars have highlighted, deportation can function as an
extraordinarily harsh penalty, one that the U.S. Supreme Court has
characterized as resulting in “the loss of all that makes life worth living.”20
Notwithstanding its civil label, deportation may be experienced as punitive,
18 While this Article focuses on undocumented migrants, it is important to note that many of
the arguments apply to those with various forms of legal status as well. See infra Part II.
19 See, e.g., Julia Preston, Record Number of Foreigners Were Deported in 2011, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 7, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/08/us/us-deports-record-number-of-foreigners-in2011.html [https://perma.cc/TK99-ERHD] (discussing deportations at an “all-time high” under President
Obama); Amy B. Wang, Donald Trump Plans to Immediately Deport 2 Million to 3 Million Undocumented
Immigrants, WASH.
POST (Nov.
14,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/11/13/donald-trump-plans-to-immediately-deport-2-to-3-million-undocumentedimmigrants/?utm_term=.1a195cd655dc [http://perma.cc/YYB9-TSAZ] (quoting President-elect Donald
Trump as stating, “a lot of these people, probably 2 million, it could be even 3 million, we are [going to
get] them out of our country”).
20 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276,
284 (1922)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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particularly when long-term residents are removed to dangerous countries
with which they have no remaining ties.21
Deportation is now routinely linked to criminal punishment. In 1996,
Congress vastly expanded the types of crimes that trigger mandatory
deportation.22 Six years prior, Congress had also removed a form of discretion
that had previously enabled sentencing judges to halt deportation on
equitable grounds.23 These statutory changes made many long-term lawful
permanent residents with dated or minor convictions subject to
deportation.24 Given the absence of time limitations on removal, groups such
as “Dreamers” who entered unlawfully as children and have never lived
elsewhere are subject to deportation at any time.25
Immigration scholars have shown how deportation decisions are deeply
enmeshed with the criminal process.26 Immigration cases not only dominate
the workload of federal prosecutors; they have eclipsed every other area of
prosecution.27 The criminal and immigration enforcement systems are
21 See, e.g., Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 14-22, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 1567358
(discussing long-term unauthorized residents who were deported after minor oﬀenses).
22 See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited
Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1936 (2000) (discussing how the Antiterrorism
and Eﬀective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act “drastically changed the consequences of criminal convictions for lawful permanent residents”).
23 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 361-62 (“This procedure, known as a judicial recommendation against
deportation, or JRAD, had the eﬀect of binding the Executive to prevent deportation; the statute
was consistently . . . interpreted as giving the sentencing judge conclusive authority to decide
whether a particular conviction should be disregarded as a basis for deportation.” (internal
quotations omitted)). The JRAD was abolished in 1990. For an argument in favor of restoring the
JRAD, see Jason C. Cade, Return of the JRAD, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 36 (2015).
24 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: Immigration Status
and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1423-32 (2011) (discussing how deportation can
function as punishment and also discussing other ways that noncitizens are penalized during
criminal proceedings, such as through the denial of bail); Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration
Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1709 (2011) (discussing how deportation decisions
fail to adequately consider “the events and relationships” that should “factor into decisions to waive
deportation”); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1687 (2009)
(discussing how removal decisions operate as a disproportionate punishment when it is imposed
against long-time permanent residents who have committed minor crimes).
25 Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 621-22 (2006)
(noting that in the early twentieth century, statutory limits on deportation often existed but that
today, “these time limits have all but disappeared”).
26 See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 7, at 137 (“[P]rotective features of criminal investigation and
adjudication are melting away at the edges in certain criminal cases involving migration-related
oﬀenses.”); Miller, supra note 7, at 618 (discussing the “criminalization” of immigration law);
Stumpf, supra note 7, at 376 (coining the term “crimmigration”).
27 Eagly, supra note 7, at 1281-82 (“Immigration, which now constitutes over half of the federal
criminal workload, has eclipsed all other areas of federal prosecution. Noncitizens have become the face of
federal prisons.” (footnotes omitted)); Sklansky, supra note 7, at 158 (“Immigration cases now are not only
the largest category of federal criminal prosecutions; they are a majority of federal criminal prosecutions.”).
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entwined at virtually every level, with immigration status aﬀecting decisions
such as arrest, plea bargaining, dismissal, bail, and disposition.28
As Stephen Legomsky has observed, the merger of immigration and
criminal law has been “asymmetric” in its incorporation of criminal law
enforcement norms but its rejection of criminal law’s procedural
constraints.29 Since deportation is categorized as civil,30 it does not trigger
the protections of criminal procedure.31 There is no right to counsel at the
government’s expense.32 Those who appear in immigration court are often
unrepresented, including children.33 As the former president of the National
Association of Immigration Judges put it, removal is an arena where “complex
28 See, e.g., Chin, supra note 24, at 1420 (“Far from being separate and independent from the
criminal proceeding, deportation and other aspects of immigration status are often key
considerations in the disposition of a criminal case.” (internal quotations omitted)); Eagly, supra
note 7, 1281-82 (oﬀering a description of how federal immigration enforcement oﬃcials and criminal
law enforcement oﬃcials coordinate enforcement activity so as to maximize the reach of
enforcement); Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1203-06, 1225 (2016)
(discussing how immigration considerations aﬀect the plea bargaining process); Lee, supra note 17,
at 559-71 (explaining how criminal law prosecutors, in eﬀect, exercise immigration enforcement
authority by choosing whether to charge defendants with crimes that may trigger deportation);
Sklansky, supra note 7, at 158 (“Immigration law and criminal law . . . operate[d] largely
independently for much of the twentieth century, but over the past three decades the two ﬁelds have
become increasingly intertwined.”).
29 Stephen H. Legomsky, A New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal
Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 472 (2007).
30 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729-30 (1893) (stating that deportation
proceedings have “all the elements of a civil case” and are “in no proper sense a trial or sentence for
a crime or oﬀense”).
31 See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION 2 (2007) (“One wonders how those who
experienced the Palmer Raids would react if they could have foreseen that, nearly a century later,
over 325,000 people would face removal proceedings in a single year, many under mandatory
detention, unprotected from unreasonable searches and selective prosecution, only a third
represented by counsel, and none with the right to appointed counsel.”).
32 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012)
(providing that alien will be represented “at no expense to the Government” in removal proceedings);
Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that aliens may obtain
counsel at their own expense in removal proceedings); see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Privatized
Immigration Enforcement, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 1, 4 (2017) (“Migrants have a right to counsel
in removal proceedings, but not at the government’s expense.”); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is
Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1302 (2011) (“[T]he government can whisk immigrants away
into detention thousands of miles away from their home where they lack access to the counsel,
evidence, and witnesses they need to prevail in their removal proceeding . . . .”).
33 See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration
Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2015) (“By looking at individual removal cases decided on the merits,
we ﬁnd that only 37% of immigrants had counsel during our study period from 2007 to 2012.”);
Fernanda Santos, It’s Children Against Federal Lawyers in Immigration Court, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/us/in-immigration-court-children-must-serve-as-theirown-lawyers.html [https://perma.cc/SVF4-EJ4M] (noting that unlike in criminal proceedings or
child welfare proceedings, children are required to represent themselves in an adversarial proceeding
against a government lawyer).
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and high stakes matters . . . are being adjudicated in a setting which most
closely resembles traﬃc court.”34
In a nod to the “death is diﬀerent” jurisprudence,35 some writers have
conceptualized deportation as a “diﬀerent” penalty.36 Just as the death penalty
triggers heightened procedures as compared to other criminal cases, they
argue, deportation should likewise trigger heightened procedural
protections.37 This approach focuses on how deportation is experienced,
rather than attaching signiﬁcance to the label of civil versus criminal. In a
2010 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky adopted this
view of deportation and held that defense attorneys are required to advise
defendants about the immigration consequences of guilty pleas.38 In taking
this approach, the Court emphasized how deportation carries stakes that may
be far higher than the formal criminal punishment.
In sum, some immigration scholars have emphasized how deportation
operates as a punishment, regardless of its formal label. They have also
emphasized how deportation may be triggered without adequate procedural
safeguards. The relevant point of comparison in this analysis tends to be
between felony criminal enforcement and immigration enforcement.
II. THE INTERIOR STRUCTURE OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
Despite its many contributions, the deportation-centric approach
understates the reach of immigration enforcement. Deportation is not
34 Memorandum from Dana Leigh Marks, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges 2 (Oct.
2009),
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/NAIJ%20Priorities%20Short%20List%20%20October%202009.pdf [https://perma.cc/28BG-EMYX]; see also Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the
Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 182 (2017) (citing the description of immigration
court given by Dana Leigh Marks).
35 For a summary and critique of this jurisprudence, which triggers heightened procedural
protections for capital cases as compared to other criminal cases, see Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of
Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 1145, 1162-74 (2009).
36 See, e.g., Beth Caldwell, Banished for Life: Deportation of Juvenile Oﬀenders as Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2261, 2262 (2013) (“Every one knows that to be forcibly taken
away from home and family and friends and business and property, and sent across the ocean to a
distant land, is punishment, and that oftentimes most severe and cruel.” (quoting Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting))); Aliza B. Kaplan, Disabled and
Disserved: The Right to Counsel for Mentally Disabled Aliens in Removal Proceedings, 26 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 523, 524 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court described deportation as “result[ing] in the loss
of ‘all that makes life worth living’” (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945)));
Markowitz, supra note 32, at 1301-02 (“[D]eportation does not ﬁt neatly into the civil or criminal
box, but rather . . . it lives in the netherworld in between.”).
37 For a discussion of how civil legal providers and criminal defense attorneys have attempted
to ﬁll a gap in the provision of immigration legal services, see generally Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s
Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282 (2013).
38 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).
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synonymous with immigration enforcement. It is perhaps not even the most
salient benchmark for evaluating immigration enforcement. Rather, it is the
tip of a much larger enforcement pyramid.
At the top of the pyramid are the relatively few who are placed in removal
proceedings. At the base are those who remain present long-term without
lawful immigration status. Somewhere in the middle are those who
experience formal mechanisms of immigration enforcement short of
deportation, such as arrest or detention.
Those who are never placed in removal proceedings still experience
immigration enforcement in a number of ways. In recent years, immigration
screening has been increasingly linked to routine interactions, including with
police, employers, housing providers, and others. The theory behind this
approach is that immigration enforcement is an additive that can be folded
into the process of arrest or of employee hiring without changing the nature
of the underlying relationship. In theory, it can serve as a cost-eﬀective way
of identifying and removing those who are deportable.
These enforcement mechanisms, however, create hidden costs. They
reorder power dynamics; they place employers, police, and others in positions
of power relative to unauthorized migrants. This, in turn, has a far-reaching
impact, including on those who never experience deportation. Awareness of
the possibility that routine interactions may trigger heightened enforcement
can suppress socially valuable behavior.
Before proceeding further, a note on terminology is in order. While my
focus is on undocumented migrants, many aspects of this analysis apply to
those with legal immigration status as well. Despite popular accounts that
frequently depict sharply delineated categories of “legal” versus “illegal”
aliens, there is no such sharp distinction. Immigration status “can more
accurately be understood as existing along a spectrum.”39 Some of those
currently without legal status exist in what immigration scholar David Martin
has described as “twilight” statuses, where they may be eligible for legal status
in the future.40 Others with legal status are aware of the possibility that their
status may be revoked or changed.41 Thus, while the analysis centers on
undocumented migrants, it is not limited to undocumented migrants.
This Part sketches the contours of the immigration enforcement pyramid,
describes immigration enforcement mechanisms other than deportation, and
explains their impact at the base of the pyramid.
39 Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement,
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1137 (2013).
40 David A. Martin, Twilight Statuses: A Closer Examination of the Unauthorized Population,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST., June 2005, at 1 (describing how certain categories of immigrants may
have claims to obtain lawful permanent resident status, such as temporary protected status).
41 For instance, lawful permanent residents may be subject to deportation based on criminal convictions.
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A. The Immigration Enforcement Pyramid
The heuristic of the pyramid offers one way to illuminate the reach of
immigration enforcement. It shows the centrality of enforcement mechanisms
other than deportation, the role of actors other than federal immigration
enforcement agents, and the manner in which enforcement practices at the
base of the pyramid operate differently from enforcement at the top. In its
reach, immigration enforcement mirrors in certain respects Alexandra
Natapoff ’s discussion of the “penal pyramid” in the criminal justice system.42
The pyramid oﬀers one helpful analogy for understanding the reach of
interior immigration. The pyramid might also be described as an iceberg:
removal numbers capture the tip of the iceberg, but they do not begin to
capture the impact of immigration enforcement on those at the bottom, who
remain present and aware of the possibility of removal.43 The heuristic of the
pyramid is useful, ﬁrst, in oﬀering a visual that captures the reach of
immigration enforcement beyond the removal numbers. It also shows how
immigration policy debates that focus on deportation ignore much of the
interior work that immigration enforcement is doing.
In the context of misdemeanors, Natapoff employs the pyramid as a way to
understand the scope of the penal system. Just as felonies tend to dominate
criminal law scholarship, deportation tends to dominate immigration policy
discussions. In both criminal law and immigration scholarship, the focus on the
most severe type of penalty—a prison term or deportation, respectively—tends
to obscure the significance of other forms of enforcement.
Second, the focus on deportation obscures key elements of how
immigration enforcement operates. For the vast majority who remain present
long-term, immigration enforcement operates through awareness that routine
interactions may trigger deportation or other associated penalties, such as arrest
or family separation. Removal numbers fail to capture this dimension of
immigration enforcement, just as statistics on mass incarceration—troubling as
they are—fail to capture the true scope of the criminal justice system.44
See generally Natapoﬀ, supra note 8.
I do not mean to suggest that the pyramid is the only heuristic for visualizing the reach of
the immigration enforcement system. As Juliet Stumpf has helpfully suggested to me, immigration
enforcement could also be conceptualized as a Venn diagram with overlapping areas of influence, such
as with police and employers.
44 As Natapoff develops, misdemeanors constitute an estimated eighty percent of state court
workloads. Natapoff, supra note 8, at 80. The vast majority of people who experience contact with the
criminal justice system do so through the misdemeanor process. Id. at 79-80. For recent contributions
to the burgeoning literature on misdemeanors, see generally ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN,
MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING (2018); ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME (2018);
Brandon Buskey & Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Keeping Gideon’s Promise: Using Equal Protection to Address
the Denial of Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2299 (2017); Samuel R. Gross,
42
43
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Third, a focus on deportation fails to capture the signiﬁcance of the threat
of an arrest. In the immigration context, arrest matters not just because it is
the ﬁrst step on the path toward deportation; it also can trigger family
separation or detention in its own right. In this respect, immigration
enforcement also bears similarities to low-level criminal law enforcement.
Although criminal defendants are entitled to the presumption of innocence,
a mere arrest carries signiﬁcant penalties, such as ﬁnes, jail time, loss of work,
or potential eviction from public housing, regardless of whether a criminal
conviction is ultimately imposed.45 Thus, an arrest—even if it is unlikely to
result in a conviction—can carry signiﬁcant costs. Similarly, the threat of an
arrest—either a criminal arrest or an immigration arrest—is meaningful, even
if that arrest is unlikely to result ultimately in removal.
Relatedly, for both immigration and for low-level criminal offenses, public
and private actors have broad discretion to initiate arrest by contacting law
enforcement.46 Arrest decisions reflect a number of factors other than probable
cause. Race in particular plays an important role in determining who is arrested
for both immigration crimes and other crimes.47 Black and Latino men are
significantly more likely to be arrested than whites.48 In the immigration
context, “appearance of Mexican ancestry” may be used to justify stops.49

Errors in Misdemeanor Adjudication, 98 B.U. L. REV. 999 (2018); Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal
Justice, 67 DUKE L.J. 1381 (2018); Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L.
REV. 953 (2018); Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738
(2017); Alexandra Natapoff, The High Stakes of Low-Level Criminal Justice, 128 YALE L.J. 1648 (2019);
Jenny Roberts, Informed Misdemeanor Sentencing, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171 (2017); and Megan
Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 731 (2018).
45 Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, supra note 44, at 954 (explaining how the constraints
of criminal procedure do not work as intended, given the impact of arrest even without conviction).
46 To be clear, criminal law enforcement and immigration enforcement, in practice, have substantial
overlap. See, e.g., Eagly, supra note 7, at 1288 (discussing role overlap with federal prosecutors and
immigration prosecutors); Sklansky, supra note 7, at 159 (“Immigration enforcement and criminal justice
are now so thoroughly entangled it is impossible to say where one starts and the other leaves off; growing
numbers of practitioners describe themselves as working in the merged field of ‘crimmigration.’”).
47 See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (determining that
New York City police oﬃcers made 4,400,000 stops pursuant to its “stop and frisk” policy in an
eight-year period from 2004 to 2012 and that over eighty percent of those stopped were racial
minorities); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 817-25 (2015) (summarizing
arrest statistics and providing potential reasons for high rates of arrest).
48 Arrests themselves have a signiﬁcant racialized impact. One out of every three American
youths can expect to be arrested by the age of twenty-three. Robert Brame et al., Cumulative
Prevalence of Arrest from Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 25 (2012).
Approximately forty-nine percent of black men and forty-four percent of Latino men will be
arrested by the age of twenty-three. Robert Brame et al., Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest
Prevalence by Ages 18 and 23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 478 (2014).
49 See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1543, 1548-49 (2011) (discussing Supreme Court doctrine that has sanctioned the practice of
using racial identity as “a basis for determining whether a person is undocumented or ‘illegal’”).
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Immigration enforcement of course has important diﬀerences from
misdemeanor enforcement. Misdemeanors matter because they trigger
signiﬁcant hidden costs, such as loss of work, potential jail time, and other
consequences of a criminal record.50 But in the absence of more serious
charged conduct, an arrest alone is not the ﬁrst step toward a lengthy prison
sentence. By contrast, arrest in the immigration context may also be the ﬁrst
step on the path toward deportation—though in practice, the vast majority of
undocumented migrants will never be removed.
The bottom of the immigration enforcement pyramid is also far less
defined than the bottom of the misdemeanor pyramid. Generally, the size of
the misdemeanor system is estimated by the number of arrests filed in any
given year.51 Yet the size of the bottom of the immigration enforcement
pyramid is murky. The same forces that lead undocumented migrants to lay
low and avoid detection also make it hard to measure the size of undocumented
population, its characteristics, and the impact of immigration enforcement.
The balance of this Part focuses on two important aspects of immigration
enforcement at the bottom of the pyramid: the role of enforcement
mechanisms other than deportation and the role of actors other than federal
immigration enforcement oﬃcials.
B. Enforcement Mechanisms
Although deportation receives the lion’s share of attention, other
immigration enforcement mechanisms, such as arrest, detention, or family
separation, affect far more people.52 In some cases, these mechanisms operate in
tandem with deportation: the prospect of prolonged immigration detention, for
instance, leads some undocumented migrants to agree to “voluntary” removal.53
In other cases, these enforcement mechanisms combine with deportation; those
who are ultimately removed first experience arrest and detention.
50 See, e.g., JAMES JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 1-8 (2015) (discussing the
impact of a criminal record).
51 A common complaint about misdemeanors is shoddy recordkeeping that makes it difficult to
identify exactly how many cases are processed each year. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320 (“Unlike felony cases and convictions, about which federal and state governments
keep relatively good records, the world of misdemeanor cases is radically underdocumented.”); Stevenson
& Mayson, supra note 44, at 733-34 (noting that the lack of data regarding misdemeanors extends even
to basic information such as the number of misdemeanor filings each year).
52 These are mechanisms of immigration enforcement insofar as they “give force to”
immigration laws. For an explanation of how “private enforcement” of immigration laws functions
to give eﬀect to immigration law, see, e.g., Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration
Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777, 784 (2008).
53 ”Voluntary” removal does not carry the bar on readmission that is triggered by formal
removal. However, in practice, it is not voluntary in the sense of being freely chosen or desired.
Those who are voluntarily removed, for instance, may be accompanied by an ICE escort.
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Arrest is one important mechanism of immigration enforcement. Since
2013, when Secure Communities was rolled out on a nationwide basis, every
custodial criminal arrest—meaning one where the arrested individual is taken
to the precinct and fingerprinted—has triggered immigration screening.54
Secure Communities operates as an information sharing arrangement between
local police, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).55
When an arrested individual is booked, his fingerprints are taken and shared
with DHS, which then cross-checks the fingerprints against a separate
immigration-related fingerprint database. The goal is to screen for
unauthorized presence.56 If the cross-check returns a “hit,” that signals that the
arrested individual may be present without authorization.57 If DHS makes a
probable cause determination that the arrested individual is present without
authorization, the agency has the discretion to send a detainer request to the
local jail.58 The detainer notifies the jail that the arrested individual is suspected
of lacking lawful immigration status and requests that the jail retain custody of
the arrested individual for an additional forty-eight hours after he would
otherwise be released, so that immigration enforcement officials can come to
the facility and assume custody.59 Secure Communities thus vastly raises the
stakes of low-level arrests.60 Any arrest, regardless of the charge—and
regardless of whether it is ultimately dismissed—may trigger deportation.
54 For a discussion of the rollout of Secure Communities, see Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles,
Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 87-90 (2013).
55 While Secure Communities is the most widespread use of arrests as an immigration
enforcement tool, it is not the only use of arrest as an immigration enforcement tool. Some arrests
are for immigration-related crime, such as misdemeanor illegal reentry or felony illegal reentry
following deportation. See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
§ 103(a), 100 Stat. 3359, 3380 (codiﬁed as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b)) (“Whoever uses . . . an
identiﬁcation document, knowing (or having reason to know) that the document was not issued
lawfully for the use of the possessor . . . shall be ﬁned under this title, imprisoned not more than 5
years, or both.”). ICE agents also make their own immigration arrests.
56 See Jain, supra note 47, at 826-27 (describing the information-sharing arrangement of the
Secure Communities program).
57 This enforcement approach is underinclusive because the immigration database only
contains entries for those who have previously been ﬁngerprinted by DHS, such as those who
entered lawfully and then overstayed a visa. Those who have never previously been ﬁngerprinted,
such as those who entered unlawfully and were not detected by immigration enforcement oﬃcials,
would not return a hit.
58 In the original iteration of Secure Communities, detainers were not supported by probable
cause. Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO. L.J. 125, 13133 (2015) (discussing case law ﬁnding Fourth Amendment violations in cases where detainers were
unsupported by probable cause).
59 Id. at 131; see also Jain, supra note 47, at 828-29.
60 The vast majority of arrests are for low-level offenses, and many of them never result in
conviction. Low-level marijuana arrests, for instance, far outstrip arrests for more serious crimes.
Christopher Ingraham, More People Were Arrested Last Year over Pot than for Murder, Rape, Aggravated
Assault
and
Robbery—Combined,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
26,
2017),
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Beyond arrest, immigration detention itself serves as an enforcement
mechanism, albeit one closely associated with deportation.61 In practice,
immigration detention is indistinguishable from criminal detention.62 Some
immigrant detainees are housed in the same prisons and jails as prisoners.63
The threat of detention plays an important role in giving both criminal and
immigration prosecutors more leverage than they would otherwise have.
Prosecutors can leverage the threat of prolonged detention to induce
“voluntary” removal. This pattern unfolded on a mass scale in a 2008
immigration raid in Postville, Iowa. Over the course of four days, 270 workers
signed “‘exploding’ plea agreements, entered binding felony guilty pleas in
court, and received criminal sentences.”64 The workers agreed to the pleas in
part because they were aware that they would otherwise face continued
detention.65 As Juliet Stumpf has observed, “Some workers spoke up, asking
for immediate deportation instead of the insistence on incarceration.”66

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/09/26/more-people-were-arrested-last-yearover-pot-than-for-murder-rape-aggravated-assault-and-robbery-combined/?utm_term=.f3d402333229
[https://perma.cc/RQ92-H6F7].
61 See, e.g., Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional Barriers to
Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 137-38 (2013) (documenting a dramatic increase in detention over
the past twenty-ﬁve years). ICE now reports an average daily detained population of close to 38,000,
and the Trump administration recently sought to increase funding to support an average daily
population of 48,000 adults. Laurel Wamsley, As It Makes More Arrests, ICE Looks for More Detention
Centers, NPR (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/26/560257834/as-itmakes-more-arrests-ice-looks-for-more-detention-centers [https://perma.cc/TYF8-TPEW]; see also
Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 43 (2010) (noting
that “detention now represents a deprivation as severe as removal itself ”).
62 See Emily Ryo, Fostering Legal Cynicism Through Immigration Detention, 90 S. CAL. L. REV.
999, 1024-37 (2017) (explaining how immigration detention is experienced as punitive,
notwithstanding the civil label); see also César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention
as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1349 (2014) (“Whatever the actual reason for detention and
despite immigration detention’s legal characterization as civil, individuals in immigration confinement
are frequently perceived to be no different than individuals in penal confinement.”); Eli Rosenberg,
So Many Immigrants Are Being Arrested that ICE Is Going to Transfer 1,600 to Federal Prisons, WASH.
POST (June 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/06/07/so-manyimmigrants-are-being-arrested-that-ice-is-going-to-transfer-1600-to-federalprisons/?utm_term=.8b6caa17934e [https://perma.cc/WQ49-735J]. Dora Schriro, a former director of
the Office of Detention Policy and Planning, stated, “Immigration Detention and Criminal
Incarceration detainees tend to be seen by the public as comparable, and both confined populations
are typically managed in similar ways.” DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2009).
63 Rosenberg, supra note 62.
64 Eagly, supra note 7, at 1301; see also Juliet Stumpf, The Process Is the Punishment in
Crimmigration Law, in THE BORDERS OF PUNISHMENT 59 (Katja Franko Aas & Mary Bosworth
eds., 2013) (noting that the majority of the workers took the deal because “[t]he plea oﬀered the
certainty of quicker release and the avoidance of formal proceedings . . . .”).
65 Stumpf, supra note 64.
66 Id.

2019]

The Interior Structure of Immigration Enforcement

1479

In addition to arrest and detention, the threat of family separation functions
as a highly visible enforcement mechanism. Just as the presence of family in
the United States constitutes part of the “pull” factor of immigration,67 the risk
of family separation plays an important role in immigration enforcement.
Unauthorized or “mixed” immigration status families with minor children in
particular report being keenly aware of the possibility of separation.68
As in the criminal context, any arrest, including a minor one, can trigger
family separation. Immigration-related arrests, however, create heightened
susceptibility to family separation, and they also magnify the likelihood that
children will be left without adequate supervision. For one, in the criminal
context, arrest typically occurs individually. By contrast, interior immigration
enforcement has periodically occurred on a mass scale, with workplace raids that
round up and apprehend hundreds of suspected unauthorized workers at a time.
This, in turn, magnifies the likelihood of prolonged family separation. When
police make arrests, they are supposed to follow protocols designed to ensure
that minor children are provided with social services support.69 Immigration
lawyers, however, have argued that similar protocols have not been followed in
workplace raids, given factors such as language barriers and the possibility that
arrested workers may be transported and detained in remote facilities.
A lawsuit challenging a factory raid in Massachusetts over a decade ago
remains illustrative. ICE agents arrested over 300 employees, placed them in
custody for civil immigration violations, and transported them to detention in
Texas.70 The workers alleged that child welfare agencies were not given
sufficient notice of the raid, which left minor children without adult
supervision.71 Recent raids have taken place on an even larger scale and exhibited
similar dynamics.72 Immigration advocates have documented prolonged family
67 See, e.g., Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 629,
630 (2014) (“The vast majority of immigrants who acquire permanent residency each year do so
based on family ties.”).
68 See RANDY CAPPS ET AL., A PROFILE OF U.S. CHILDREN WITH UNAUTHORIZED PARENTS 1
(2016) (reporting that 4,100,000 U.S. citizen children live with at least one parent who is an unauthorized
migrant); Leisy J. Abrego & Cecilia Menjívar, Immigrant Latina Mothers as Targets of Legal Violence, 37 INT’L
J. SOC. FAM. 9, 12-14 (2011) (describing how fear of family separation influences decisions of
undocumented mothers, such as deciding to keep children from school and avoiding contact with public
agencies); Nina Rabin, Understanding Secondary Immigration Enforcement: Immigrant Youth and Family
Separation in a Border County, 47 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 15-20 (2018) (discussing how fear of separation affects
youth); Vikki Ortiz, Mixed-Status Immigrant Families Fear Trump’s Policies to Come, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 18,
2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-immigrants-mixed-status-trump-met-20170118-story.html
(discussing how long-term undocumented parents with U.S. citizen children fear family separation).
69 See Jain, supra note 47, at 841-42 & nn.170-74 (discussing protocols that police departments
take to notify social services in order to care for minor children after a custodial parent’s arrest).
70 Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007).
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1092-93 (2008) (“ICE arrested 1,282 workers [during a raid on six Swift & Co.
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separation, with mass arrest and detention leaving children of workers “stranded
at daycare centers and with babysitters,” landlords, or relatives.73
Until recently, family separation has typically been conceptualized as a
collateral or inevitable “third party” harm that results from enforcement
decisions, rather than as a means of deterrence in itself.74 Yet in the
immigration context, family separation itself has been appropriated as a
means of deterrence.75 During a six-week period in April and May 2018, DHS
separated nearly 2000 children from their parents.76 The numbers are
unprecedented in recent history. By way of comparison, during a spike in
unlawful entry during the summer of 2013, when Border Patrol apprehended
over 6000 families, less than 500 were transferred to ICE custody for any
purpose.77 The 2018 family separations involved more than just those
apprehended during the course of unlawful entry. They also included asylum
seekers who entered lawfully by appearing at a port of entry and who

meatpacking plants] on immigration violations and some existing criminal warrants. Most workers
arrested were placed in immigration removal proceedings. About 240 workers were charged criminally.”).
73 See Maria Sacchetti, ICE Raids Meatpacking Plant in Rural Tennessee; 91 Immigrants Arrested,
WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.lmtonline.com/news/article/ICE-raids-meatpackingplant-in-Tennessee-97-12812525.php [https://perma.cc/H6FR-V3DK] (describing an immigration
raid that resulted in ninety-seven arrests, one of the largest workplace raids in a decade); Samantha
Schmidt, ‘Utter Chaos’: ICE Arrests 114 Workers in Immigration Raid at Ohio Gardening Company,
WASH.
POST
(June
6,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2018/06/06/utter-chaos-ice-arrests-114-workers-in-immigration-raid-at-ohio-gardeningcompany/?utm_term=.b7ed0035b407 [https://perma.cc/Z28B-DYFP] (reporting a mass raid carried
out by 200 federal immigration oﬃcials that resulted in 114 arrests); see also Elizabeth Oglesby, U.S.
Communities Can Suﬀer Long-Term Consequences After Immigration Raids, CONVERSATION (June 18,
2018), https://theconversation.com (search “US communities can suﬀer long-term”; then follow
article hyperlink) [https://perma.cc/98S7-PWVJ] (describing the eﬀects on the community of the
2008 Massachusetts raid, including children who were separated from their parents and found in
empty apartments by their landlords).
74 Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 1400 (2002)
(describing “third party interests” in criminal law and offering the interests of families of a criminal
defendant as an example of a “collateral consequence visited upon others when an offender is punished”).
75 See, e.g., Transcript: White House Chief of Staﬀ John Kelly’s Interview with NPR, NPR (May 11,
2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/11/610116389/transcript-white-house-chief-of-staﬀ-john-kellysinterview-with-npr [https://perma.cc/AT5Z-F9B2] (stating that family separation serves as a
deterrent to illegal immigration); see also Emily Ryo, Detention as Deterrence, 71 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 237, 239 (2019) (drawing on “literature in psychology, behavioral economics, and
criminology to suggest that detention as deterrence is unlikely to operate in the way that some
policymakers might expect or desire”).
76 Michael Scherer & Josh Dawsey, Trump Cites as Negotiating Tool his Policy of Separating Immigrant
Children
from
Their
Parents,
WASH.
POST
(June
15,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-cites-as-a-negotiating-tool-his-policy-ofseparating-immigrant-children-from-their-parents/2018/06/15/ade82b80-70b3-11e8-bf86a2351b5ece99_story.html?utm_term=.88a424bbee9f [https://perma.cc/X5N3-G8YA].
77 Declaration of Ronald Vitiello at 7, Flores v. Lynch, 212 F. Supp. 3d 907 (2015) (No. 854544), https://www.aila.org/File/Related/14111359n.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC7U-L45Y].
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articulated a credible fear of persecution.78 In hundreds of cases, family
separation remained prolonged. Two months after a federal judge ordered the
families reunited, over 400 children remained separated from their parents.79
The 2018 family separations had far-reaching implications, and not only
because of their scale and duration. They represented a deliberate decision to
use family separation itself as an enforcement tool, rather than treating family
separation as an unfortunate but inevitable byproduct of the decision to
deport adults. As a widely circulated audio recording of separated children
demonstrated, line-level enforcement oﬃcials were well aware that the policy
of separating children imposed stark and immediate trauma.80 The
separations, in eﬀect, signaled a choice to impose trauma on children with the
aim of deterrence. They also signaled what leading immigration scholar David
Martin described as an “astounding casualness about precise tracking of
family relationships—as though eventual reuniﬁcation was deemed unlikely
or at least unimportant, even for toddlers and preschoolers.”81 The family
separations also showed the limits of legal rules. Government oﬃcials missed
78 Karoun Demirjian, GOP, Democrats Are Outraged but at Odds over Ending Family Separation at
the Border, WASH. POST (June 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/gopdemocrats-are-outraged-but-at-odds-over-ending-family-separation-at-border/2018/06/17/6667f3a47247-11e8-b4b7-308400242c2e_story.html?utm_term=.bab7d23d4734 [https://perma.cc/JTN2-TJZZ]
(quoting Republican Senator Susan Collins as noting “numerous credible media accounts” revealing
that parents who appear at a legal port of entry and claim asylum are being separated from their
children); Miriam Jordan, Family Separation at Border May Be Subject to Constitutional Challenge, Judge
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/06/us/family-separationsmigrants-court.html [https://perma.cc/SQ62-GTV6] (discussing the case of an asylum seeker who
appeared at a port of entry and was forcibly separated from her seven-year-old daughter, who was
placed in a separate detention facility, for a period of four months); Joshua Barajas, More than 400
Migrant Children Remain Separated from Their Parents. Here’s What We Know, PBS (Sept. 7, 2018, 5:11
PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/more-than-400-migrant-children-remain-separatedfrom-their-parents-heres-what-we-know [https://perma.cc/Z46D-WR7M] (reporting on DHS’s
adaptation of new regulations that would allow the government to detain children of migrants for
periods longer than twenty days); Joel Rose, Doctors Concerned About ‘Irreparable Harm’ to Separated
Migrant Children, NPR (June 15, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/15/620254326/doctors-warnabout-dangers-of-child-separations [https://perma.cc/Q6E7-A9XH] (describing the potential longterm medical consequences of holding separated migrant children in a shelter, such as behavioral
problems and poor brain development).
79 Barajas, supra note 78.
80 See Ginger Thompson, Listen to Children Who’ve Just Been Separated from Their Parents at the
Border, PROPUBLICA (June 18, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/children-separated-fromparents-border-patrol-cbp-trump-immigration-policy [https://perma.cc/G3FX-WXRB] (presenting
audio recording of children weeping while a border patrol agent comments that “we have an orchestra
here” and “[w]hat’s missing is a conductor”).
81 See Letter from David A. Martin, Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, to Kirstjen M. Nielsen,
Sec’y of Homeland Sec. (July 16, 2018) (stating reasons for resigning from the Homeland Security
Advisory Council (HSAC)) (on ﬁle with author). Professor Martin further noted that the family
separation policy “crystallized for many HSAC members profound doubts about the administration’s
commitment to the rule of law.” Id.
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court-imposed reuniﬁcation deadlines because they deported some parents
without reuniting them with their children ﬁrst.82
C. Multiple Enforcement Agents
In the past twenty years, federal immigration enforcement has become
remarkably diffuse; a host of public and private actors engage in enforcement,
not just federal immigration enforcement officials. Immigration screening and
surveillance occurs during the process of booking an arrested individual and
during the process of employee hiring.83 In the context of policing, Secure
Communities automates information sharing between local police and DHS.84
In the context of employment, E-Verify automates the process of determining
whether new employees have lawful immigration status as required by the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.85 This dynamic is the product
of technological changes that permit immigration screening and surveillance in
routine circumstances,86 and federal decisions to delegate enforcement
authority to an array of actors. In addition, states and localities have periodically
made efforts to assert their own immigration enforcement power.87
One stated rationale for these programs is to widen the enforcement net
in a cost-eﬀective way. While unlawful entry receives the lion’s share of
attention, a signiﬁcant percentage of the undocumented population entered
82 John Burnett, Government Misses Migrant Family Reunification Deadline, NPR (July 10, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/07/10/627821359/government-misses-migrant-family-reunification-deadline
[https://perma.cc/JGS9-VVM7].
83 See Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1, 8 (2014) (identifying “four distinct
sets of immigration surveillance practices: identification, screening and authorization, mobility
tracking and control, and information sharing” (emphasis omitted)); Stephen Lee, Workplace
Enforcement Workarounds, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 549, 554 (2012) (“While there are many social
institutions through which migrants move, two have emerged as central to immigration law’s
interior enforcement agenda: the workplace and the criminal justice system.”).
84 Anil Kalhan, Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance,
and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1108 (2013).
85 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101(b), 100 Stat. 3359,
3365-68 (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2012)); Juliet P. Stumpf, Getting to Work: Why Nobody Cares
About E-Verify (and Why They Should), 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 381, 383 (2012). Some states passed
similar laws prior to IRCA. See Pham, supra note 52, at 787 (“In 1971, ﬁfteen years before IRCA,
California passed a law that prohibited employers from knowingly hiring unauthorized workers and
threatened them with civil ﬁnes of $200 to $1000 for violations. Ten states and one city soon followed
suit, passing similar legislation.” (footnote omitted)).
86 Kalhan, supra note 83, at 8.
87 The most well-known example is Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
Neighborhoods Act, commonly known as S.B. 1070. 2010 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 113 (West). In 2012, the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down several provisions of the law, including a provision that gave local
police oﬃcers the ability to conduct warrantless arrests of anyone “the oﬃcer has probable cause to
believe . . . has committed any public oﬀense that makes the person removable.” Arizona v. United
States, 567 U.S. 387, 393 (2012). For a discussion of S.B. 1070, see Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power
Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 626-34 (2013).
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lawfully and then overstayed a visa.88 Any eﬀective immigration enforcement
policy therefore must contain an interior enforcement component. State and
local police act as “force multipliers” who, in the words of Kris Kobach, cast
an immense net by providing “occasional, passive, voluntary [assistance] . . .
during the course of normal law enforcement activity.” 89 In other words, the
theory is that police can conduct immigration enforcement without
undertaking any signiﬁcant additional work.90
Another stated rationale for some programs is to reduce the risk of racial
profiling. One theory is that if immigration screening occurs on every arrested
individual at the time she is taken into custody and fingerprinted, then police
officers will not try to seek out those who they suspect are undocumented on
the basis of crude racial proxies or the use of Spanish. In launching Secure
Communities, the Obama administration described the value of immigration
screening taking place “behind the scenes” of the arrest.91 The goal was for the
executive to “acquire information about where all the formally deportable
noncitizens [were], and what they [were] up to, in order . . . to make systematic
rather than arbitrary decisions about whom to deport.”92
In practice, however, linking arrests to immigration enforcement still
creates incentives for police oﬃcers to engage in racial proﬁling, even when
the immigration screening is done on the back end. Police remain aware of
the likelihood that all arrests trigger immigration screening. As Hiroshi
Motomura has discussed, police who view deportation as a desirable end have
incentives to make arrests on the basis of suspected unauthorized status, even
if those arrests are unlikely to result in a criminal conviction.93
Relatedly, police and other public and private actors also have incentives that
deviate from those of federal immigration enforcement officials. Employers

88 JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 1, 16 (2006) (ﬁnding that in 2006, of the approximately 11,000,000
unauthorized immigrants in the United States, twenty-ﬁve to forty percent entered lawfully but
overstayed a visa).
89 Kobach, supra note 11, at 181.
90 See Kobach, supra note 6, at 160 (“If a strategy of attrition through enforcement were implemented
nationwide, it would gradually, but inexorably, reduce the number of illegal aliens in the United States.”).
91 Memorandum from Immigration & Customs Enf ’t, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secure
Communities
Talking
Points
(Jan.
12,
2010),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/talkingpointsjanuary122010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M4XF-FQAU].
92 Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 61.
93 For an elaboration of this argument, see Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters:
Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil–Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1819, 1845 (2011).
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routinely ignore laws prohibiting the hiring of undocumented workers.94
Undocumented migrants comprise five percent of the overall U.S. workforce,
and they make up a much higher percentage of certain industries, such as
farming and construction.95 Common explanations for why employers hire
undocumented workers include labor shortages, the ease with which
employment documents can be falsified, lack of employer training in conducting
effective immigration screening, and incentives to hire cheaper workers.96
While police and employers are the most common enforcement agents, they
are far from alone. Other sites of enforcement include schools and courthouses.
In recent years, “school resource officers”—police officers posted inside
schools—have reported students to ICE on suspicion of gang membership. Yet
in practice, “gang membership” is an amorphous term untethered from any
uniform legal standards,97 which enables relatively common and innocuous
behavior to trigger immigration penalties. For instance, in March 2018, a
Baltimore student spent six months in ICE detention after a school resource
officer reported that the student had been part of a group that threatened a
classmate.98 In January 2018, a Houston student was detained by ICE for four
months after a fight with another student.99
Court personnel have also assisted immigration enforcement oﬃcials.
Enforcement in courthouses is not restricted to those convicted of criminal
oﬀenses that render them deportable. It also includes those who are arrested
for minor oﬀenses as well as those who appear as victims or witnesses.100
94 See Lee, supra note 16, at 1106 (“[W]hile it is true that IRCA formally prohibits employers from
hiring unauthorized immigrants under threat of civil and criminal sanction, it has been so infrequently
enforced that employers can escape detection in all but the most egregious circumstances.”).
95 See Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the United States, PEW RES.
CTR. (Nov. 28, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5-facts-about-illegalimmigration-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/ZD5P-46DA] (noting that unauthorized migrant workers
account for twenty-four percent of the farming industry and fifteen percent of the construction
industry); see also MAYOR’S OFFICE OF IMMIGRANT AFFAIRS, STATE OF OUR IMMIGRANT CITY
18 (2018) (observing high labor force participation of undocumented workers in New York City).
96 See e.g., David A. Martin, Resolute Enforcement Is Not Just for Restrictionists: Building a Stable
and Eﬃcient Immigration Enforcement System, 30 J.L. & POL. 411, 414 (2015) (discussing the use of
false documents to circumvent federal immigration policy); Pham, supra note 52, at 825 (noting that
private employers have no centralized source for immigration enforcement training).
97 See Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the “Criminal
Street Gang Member”, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 320 (“No uniform legal standards govern the
identiﬁcation of criminal street gang members for purposes of ICE enforcement, and while the
‘associates’ of criminal street gang members are often removed, there are no legal standards deﬁning
who constitutes an associate of a criminal street gang member.”).
98 Hannah Dreier, He Drew His School Mascot—and ICE Labeled Him a Gang Member,
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 27, 2018), https://features.propublica.org/ms-13-immigrant-students/huntingtonschool-deportations-ice-honduras/ [https://perma.cc/SG67-6ZG4].
99 Id.
100 See Devlin Barrett, DHS: Immigration Agents May Arrest Crime Victims, Witnesses at Courthouses,
WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/dhs-
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The enforcement actions discussed thus far represent systematic
delegation of immigration enforcement authority, meaning that federal
immigration agents require or encourage other actors to function as
immigration enforcement agents through formal programs. Public or private
actors also engage in immigration enforcement pursuant to state or local
ordinances that require immigration screening. One well-known example is
the ultimately invalidated Hazleton, Pennsylvania, ordinance that required
landlords to check immigration status.101 Some private actors also engage in
immigration screening because they misunderstand what their legal
obligations are—they may believe that they are required to report those
suspected of being undocumented. As Huyen Pham has discussed, for a
period of time Greyhound Bus Lines instructed employees not to sell tickets
to anyone suspected of being an illegal alien and included warnings that
employees look out for Spanish words that could reference smuggling.102
Individual companies or actors may also be motivated to engage in
immigration enforcement for other reasons. In a violation of consumer
protection law and in apparent contradiction with its own business interests,
employees at the Motel 6 Hotel chain provided conﬁdential personal
information of 9000 customers to ICE agents in the absence of any warrant.103
Immigration enforcement thus has an important hidden impact at the
bottom of the pyramid. The vast majority of the undocumented population
never experiences formal mechanisms of immigration enforcement. They are
not detained or arrested. They are certainly never deported. Yet they are keenly
aware that key institutions have the ability to trigger immigration enforcement.
Employers wear two hats: they are simultaneously employers and immigration
screeners. Police likewise fulfill their community role as police officers while
simultaneously wielding the power to trigger immigration screening.
This dynamic opens the door to racial discrimination and to the
exploitation of undocumented workers. But it also does more. It creates
immigration-agents-may-arrest-crime-victims-witnesses-at-courthouses/2017/04/04/3956e6d8-196d11e7-9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.312d9ea0e7c4 [https://perma.cc/8NW5PAKH] (“‘Just because they’re a victim in a certain case does not mean there’s not something in their
background that could cause them to be a removable alien,’ David Lapan, a Department of Homeland
Security spokesman, said in a briefing to reporters.”).
101 See Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law,
59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1734 (2010) (discussing Hazleton ordinances, adopted in 2006 and 2007 which
prohibited employers from hiring undocumented workers and landlords from renting to
undocumented migrants). The ordinances were found to be preempted by federal immigration law.
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2013).
102 See Pham, supra note 52, at 795. In response to a lawsuit from immigrant advocacy
organizations, Greyhound modified its policy. Id. at 796.
103 Alicia A. Caldwell & Chris Kirkham, Washington Attorney General Sues Motel 6 for Sharing
Guest Info with Feds, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/washington-attorneygeneral-sues-motel-6-for-sharing-guest-info-with-feds-1515016334.
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incentives for undocumented migrants to lay low and to avoid interactions
that may result in arrest, detention, family separation, and deportation.104 It
chills workers from reporting unsafe conditions or from ﬁling police reports
about unlawful activity.105 Importantly, these incentives exist to some degree
regardless of how immigration screening is in fact exercised.
Interview-based accounts with undocumented communities show that
undocumented migrants report substantial uncertainty about whether routine
interactions might trigger immigration enforcement. For instance, some
undocumented migrants report not taking children, including U.S. citizens, to
health care providers because they fear that either the children or parents may
be reported to immigration enforcement officials.106 They are less likely to
obtain health insurance for undocumented family members.107 Some report
avoiding school on days of suspected immigration raids.108 These dynamics are
pervasive, and they are reported even in so-called “sanctuary” jurisdictions.109

104 Rose Cuisan Villazor has deployed the analogy of “the undocumented closet” to describe
the dynamic of undocumented migrants living “closeted lives” that reﬂect “awareness of the everpresent threat of being deported.” Rose Cuison Villazor, The Undocumented Closet, 92 N.C. L. REV.
1, 42 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Stella Burch Elias, Immigrant Covering, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 765, 805 (2017) (observing that undocumented migrants “understand that if
they are arrested by the federal immigration authorities it will likely lead to deportation” and
therefore they “live in constant fear of removal and the attendant separation from their family,
friends, community, and property”).
105 See, e.g., Cora Engelbrecht, Fewer Immigrants Are Reporting Domestic Abuse. Police Blame Fear
of Deportation, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/03/us/immigrantshouston-domestic-violence.html [https://perma.cc/F7W5-PKZC] (describing Houston’s rapid drop
in domestic violence reports in light of tough new immigration enforcement).
106 See, e.g., Abrego & Menjívar, supra note 68, at 15-16 (collecting interview-based accounts
describing how mixed immigration status families will go to great lengths to avoid social services
providers, such as for medical care and food stamps); Leisy J. Abrego & Sarah M. Lakhani,
Incomplete Inclusion, 37 L. & POL’Y 265, 273-76 (2015) (“When [individuals] do not understand the
kind of legal standing and entitlements that immigrants in liminal, humanitarian legal statuses
oﬃcially have, immigrants may experience blocked mobility, a persistent fear of deportation,
instability, confusion, and self-blame.”); Jennifer M. Chacón, Producing Liminal Legality, 92 DENV.
U. L. REV. 709, 716 (2015) (noting how indeﬁnite administrative grace periods create even more
anxiety for “liminal legal subjects”); Cecilia Menjívar, Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan
Immigrants’ Lives in the United States, 111 AM. J. SOC. 999, 1000 (2006) (describing the pervasive sense
of anxiety created by long-term uncertainty for undocumented migrants from Guatemala and El
Salvador); Rabin, supra note 68, at 5.
107 JOANNA DREBY, EVERYDAY ILLEGAL 104-06 (2015) (reporting that of 212 children living in
eighty-one families that were interviewed, “legal status was the primary indicator of insurance
coverage,” and noting that two-thirds of U.S. citizen children in mixed immigration status families
had health insurance, while none of the forty-eight children who lacked legal immigration status did).
108 See Abrego & Menjívar, supra note 68, at 15 (presenting interview-based accounts of
undocumented mothers keeping children home from school after an immigration raid).
109 MAYOR’S OFFICE OF IMMIGRANT AFFAIRS, supra note 95, at 22 (discussing an increase
in ICE arrests and the impact on undocumented migrants who, in response, avoid areas where they
fear immigration raids).
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To some degree, this dynamic is inevitable. No one has perfect
information about enforcement choices. In a world where many people are
legally removable at any time but few will actually be removed, the executive
makes decisions about how to gather information about undocumented
migrants and prioritize removals. The enforcement process is discretionary,
which in turn creates uncertainty about how enforcement choices are made.
As a practical matter, this approach shifts discretion from the executive to
street-level agents. Immigration enforcement oﬃcials have nowhere near the
funding necessary to identify and remove the millions of noncitizens who are
legally removable. In the absence of systemic discretion about who ought to
be prioritized, removal decisions reﬂect who happens to be picked up by local
agents. As a result, front-end decisions to make arrests or to otherwise trigger
immigration enforcement carry much more weight. That, in turn, diminishes
the ability of the executive branch to determine which undocumented
migrants will be selected for removal.110
Administrations have periodically attempted to address this dynamic
through enforcement guidance. One approach is to prioritize certain types of
removals while shielding other undocumented migrants from removal. The
approach taken by the Obama administration, for instance, prioritized removal
of those with certain felony convictions above those with certain misdemeanor
convictions.111 The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program
also provided temporary relief for certain youth who met various other criteria,
such as completing high school and not having certain criminal records.112

110 See Juliet P. Stumpf, D(e)volving Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times of Secure
Communities, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (2015) (“Secure Communities achieved the ultimate
delegation downward of enforcement discretion and, as a result, deprived the executive branch of
the ability to steer the course of immigration enforcement policy.”).
111 President Obama described the approach this way: “Felons, not families. Criminals, not
children. Gang members, not a mom who’s working hard to provide for her kids.” Address to the
Nation on Immigration Reform, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Nov. 20, 2014). More specifically,
the “first priority” category included those apprehended when crossing the border, those who posed
a national security threat, and those convicted of certain felonies. Behind this group were those with
certain misdemeanor convictions and recent unlawful entrants. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles
Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski et al. (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2C7J-KUEP] (establishing priorities effective January 5, 2015).
112 See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar,
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. 1 (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6JFG7FZ]. For a discussion of DACA and DAPA, see Chacón, supra note 106, at 719, which notes that criteria
for DACA eligibility include those “who were under thirty-one on the date of the announcement, who had
entered the United States before June 15, 2007, as children under the age of sixteen, who had completed high
school, and who did not have disqualifying criminal records.”
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One policy-based criticism of this approach is that it does not do enough
to oﬀer security against the possibility of immigration enforcement.113
Delegating immigration enforcement to other actors also magniﬁes the risk
that employers, for instance, will make mistakes or engage in strategic
enforcement decisions that serve their own business interests. Employers and
private enforcers are not trained on how to conduct immigration
enforcement. Nor do they have incentives to invest time in learning how to
most eﬀectively conduct immigration screening.114 Some employers have
ﬁnancial incentives to hire undocumented workers and underpay them,
banking on their reluctance to seek legal protections.115 As a result, the use of
employers to check immigration status and keep undocumented migrants
from working has been ineﬀective.
In addition, even when employers attempt to adhere faithfully to all their
legal obligations, there remains a risk of what Professor Kathleen Kim has
described as “structural coercion,” where workers “acquiesce or decline to improve
poor working conditions because of the constraining effects of their unauthorized
status.”116 This dynamic can harm workers and employers alike because it can chill
socially useful communication about dangerous or unsafe working conditions.
Thus, even with clear enforcement guidance, there is a risk that
undocumented migrants will have powerful incentives to avoid drawing
attention to themselves. This concern has perhaps been magniﬁed with recent
enforcement guidance that broadens the categories subject to priority
removal.117 Removal priorities established in January 2017 do not diﬀerentiate
between arrest and conviction, and they also do not distinguish based on the
severity of the charged oﬀense.118

113 During the early days of Secure Communities, a signiﬁcant percentage of removals did not
fall within a stated priority area. Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf ’t, 510 F.3d 1, 6 (1st
Cir. 2007) (“The ICE agents cast a wide net and paid little attention to the detainees’ individual or
family circumstances . . . . [and subsequently] releas[ed] dozens of employees determined either to
be minors or to be legally residing in the United States . . . .”); Jain, supra note 47, at 829
(“[A]pproximately twenty percent of those deported [from the interior] had no known criminal
convictions at the time of removal.”).
114 Huyen Pham raises this point in the context of transportation providers who have been required
by some local anti-immigrant ordinances to check immigration status. Pham, supra note 52, at 777.
115 See, e.g., United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 708-09 (7th Cir. 2008) (involving
conviction of an employer for subjecting undocumented worker to forced labor conditions).
116 Kathleen Kim, Beyond Coercion, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1558, 1562 (2015).
117 A January 2017 executive order listed broad enforcement priorities, including those who
have been convicted of or charged with any criminal oﬀense, regardless of the severity. It also
included anyone who had committed acts that could be charged as a criminal oﬀense. Exec. Order
No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
118 Id.
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Recent high-profile deportations give undocumented migrants incentives
to avoid activities that might draw attention to their immigration status.119 The
practice of arresting and deporting foster families who offered to take in
detained migrant children offers one example.120 Pursuant to a memorandum
of agreement between the Department of Health and Human Services and
DHS, potential foster families are subject to background checks and
fingerprinting. The stated rationale is to ascertain whether there is “a
documented risk to the safety of the unaccompanied child.”121 However, federal
immigration enforcement officials have recently used the fingerprinting
process as a means of conducting immigration enforcement. Forty-one
potential foster care sponsors were arrested in June 2018 for immigration
violations.122 Of those arrested, a reported seventy percent had no criminal
records.123 These enforcement actions create powerful incentives for
undocumented individuals to avoid serving as foster parents. They conflict with
the enforcement objectives of Health and Human Services to ensure the safety
of children. They also create other costs, such as raising the likelihood of
children remaining in detention rather than with families.124
News reports of interior immigration enforcement also create incentives
for undocumented migrants to lay low. Consider a few examples. Pablo
Calderon had lived in the United States for a decade when he was arrested
on route to deliver pizza to an Army base. He was placed in immigration
detention for ﬁfty-three days before a federal judge ordered his release.125
The release order noted that aside from his immigration violation, Calderon
119 As Asad L. Asad has observed, this dynamic applies to documented immigrants who have
incentives to stay oﬀ the radar as well. Asad L. Asad, On the Radar: System Embeddedness and
Latin American Immigrants’ Perceived Risk of Deportation 2 (Dec. 19, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/dcgfw (“Documentation aﬀords some protection from
deportation, but it can also heighten fears since the bureaucracies that ‘document’ immigrants have
a greater perceived ability to surveil and expel them.”).
120 The policy was in place for approximately six months in 2018. Colleen Long, U.S. Reverses
NEWS,
(Dec.
18,
2018),
Policy
on
Migrant
Children’s
Sponsors,
AP
https://www.apnews.com/f34ab3a0085b453ca0d98f92bbbcbd83 [https://perma.cc/8SD9-4HBB].
121 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-506T, UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN:
DHS AND HHS HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE TRANSFERS AND MONITORING OF CARE,
BUT ACTIONS STILL NEEDED 8 (2018).
122 Caitlin Dickerson, Migrant Children Moved Under Cover of Darkness to a Texas Tent City, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/30/us/migrant-children-tent-city-texas.html
[https://perma.cc/KQW7-FEK3].
123 Id.
124 Tal Kopan, The Simple Reason More Immigrant Kids Are in Custody Than Ever Before, CNN
POLITICS (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/14/politics/immigrant-children-keptdetention/index.html [https://perma.cc/5M4C-5GFM].
125 Liz Robbins, Pizza Delivery Man Detained by ICE Is Freed by Judge, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/24/nyregion/pizza-deliveryman-deportation-judge-questions.html
[https://perma.cc/3G5G-TP9G].
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had otherwise been a “model citizen” who paid taxes, had a clean criminal
record, and who worked to support his U.S. citizen spouse and U.S. citizen
children.126 Ten-year-old Rosa Maria Hernandez, who had been living in the
United States since the age of three months, was detained in a Texas hospital
while undergoing an emergency surgery.127 She was then placed in a shelter
typically used for unaccompanied children who are apprehended while
crossing the border.128 In another widely reported Texas case, an
undocumented migrant was arrested at a courthouse when seeking a
protective order and reporting domestic abuse.129
These enforcement actions have an impact that goes well beyond the
arrested individual. While any given undocumented migrant has a low
likelihood of being detained and removed, indiscriminate interior enforcements
signals that undocumented migrants risk being apprehended on the basis of
commonplace, desirable interactions. Proponents of this approach view the
creation of a wide enforcement net as a way to encourage “self-deportation.” The
theory is that by appropriating individual actors as immigration enforcement
agents, and by sending the message that even seeking medical care or legal
assistance is fraught with the potential for arrest, detention, or deportation, the
state can encourage those present without authorization to make the decision to
leave.130 Yet in practice, this approach also leads those present long-term to make
other choices. It creates incentives for the undocumented to refuse to serve as
foster families, to steer clear of places where they might be fingerprinted or
asked to show identification, to forgo medical care or avoid reporting crime. At
the bottom of the immigration enforcement pyramid, the threat of immigration
enforcement—in its many forms—has a powerful impact, even when it does not
result in the act of removal.
III. LESSONS FROM LOW-LEVEL CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
In delegating enforcement discretion to a range of public and private actors,
immigration enforcement is not unique. It employs enforcement techniques
that are also widely used in low-level criminal law enforcement. Misdemeanor
enforcement routinely renders a large population subject to ongoing
Calderon v. Sessions, 350 F. Supp. 3d 944, 949-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
Marwa Eltagouri, A 10-Year-Old Immigrant Was Rushed to the Hospital in an Ambulance. She Was
Detained on the Way., WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2017/10/26/a-10-year-old-immigrant-was-rushed-to-the-hospital-in-an-ambulance-she-wasdetained-on-the-way/?utm_term=.bfb4e86ae5c0 [https://perma.cc/WT4G-Y85Y].
128 Id.
129 Engelbrecht, supra note 105.
130 K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1878, 1882 (2019) (describing the
concept of “self-deportation” as one where immigration enforcement is designed to make
“unbearable” the lives of people the state wishes to remove).
126
127
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surveillance and to the threat of serious sanctions by public and private actors
alike. Police who engage in “order maintenance” policing make high-volume,
low-level arrests. The goal is not to maximize convictions, but to gather data
about people over time, which is then used for risk assessment. Prosecutors
monitor how many arrests a certain individual has had within a given period of
time to determine whether to pursue criminal charges.131
Private actors engage in monitoring as well. Employers, for instance,
function as law enforcement oﬃcers for parolees and probationers when they
monitor whether the supervised population complies with court-ordered
work requirements. They, in eﬀect, have the ability to determine whether a
probationer ends up in prison. Landlords function as law enforcement when
“nuisance” ordinances require them to evict tenants based on suspected
disorderly or criminal activity. Landlords who have the ability to credibly
threaten eviction based on calls to 911 wield signiﬁcant leverage over tenants.
Beyond formal monitoring mechanisms, arrests alone—regardless of
whether they result in conviction—can trigger serious penalties, such as jail time
for those who owe outstanding child support,132 eviction for arrested individuals
who live in public housing,133 or loss of custody, particularly if a parent is already
involved with social services supervision.134 These civil penalties may be
experienced as more harmful than any formal criminal sentence.
Thus, it is not only undocumented migrants who experience ongoing
monitoring and the potential for serious adverse consequences triggered by
routine interactions. For many, low-level contact with the criminal justice
system can also have outsized consequences. While immigration scholars have
assessed how deportation can resemble criminal punishment, thus far, they
have overlooked how immigration enforcement techniques short of
deportation resemble low-level criminal law techniques.
Recognizing the structural parallels between immigration enforcement
and low-level criminal law enforcement has important conceptual payoffs. It
shows that certain costs of immigration enforcement—undocumented workers
being subject to exploitation or avoiding contact with the police—are neither
unique to immigration enforcement, nor are they inevitable. They should be
anticipated when enforcement discretion is broadly delegated to public and
131 Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 668
(2014); see also Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy
of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 455 n.12 (1990) (discussing the shift to aggregate
risk assessment, rather than individual culpability determinations, as part of the “new penology”).
132 Cortney E. Lollar, Criminalizing (Poor) Fatherhood, 70 ALA. L. REV. 125, 126 (2018).
133 See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002) (permitting a family’s
eviction from public housing based on the oﬀ-premises drug arrest of a household member); Jain,
supra note 47, at 834 (discussing Rucker).
134 Jain, supra note 47, at 842.

1492

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 1463

private actors. It also reveals hidden costs of the “force multiplier” strategy on
society at large, not just on undocumented migrants. These costs emerge not
just in immigration, but also in the low-level criminal law enforcement, where
the stakes are supposedly much lower. The comparison shows the limits of
certain deterrence arguments and suggests that some costs of monitoring a
population long-term are structural; they are not unique to immigration.
This Part takes a step back from immigration and explores structural
parallels between immigration enforcement and low-level criminal law
enforcement. It ﬁrst brieﬂy explains why it is that some populations are
unlikely to be eﬀectively deterred by criminal law enforcement. It then
analyzes structural similarities between immigration and criminal law
techniques for monitoring and considers their hidden costs.
A. The Limits of Deterrence
One rationale for highly visible interior immigration enforcements—meaning
publicized efforts to prosecute, identify and remove undocumented migrants—is
deterrence. Proponents argue that such efforts will cause those who are already
present without authorization to leave. A decade ago, Kris Kobach put it this way:
The twelve to twenty million illegal aliens in the United States need not be
rounded up and forcibly removed through direct government action. Illegal aliens
can be encouraged to depart the United States on their own . . . . Illegal aliens are
rational decision makers. If the risks of detention or involuntary removal go up,
and the probability of being able to obtain unauthorized employment goes down,
then at some point, the only rational decision is to return home.135

This argument justifies expanded interior enforcement. However, it rests on
a number of unsupported assumptions.136 It assumes that in the face of escalated
enforcement, a rational cost–benefit calculus would lead to the decision to depart
or “self-deport.”137 While this approach may work for recent arrivals or others
who can easily return to their countries of origin, it can lead those who have
deep ties to the United States to make a rational decision to try to stay off the
radar and avoid detection. The “self-deportation” approach also does not account

Kobach, supra note 6, at 156.
The author provided no support for the assertion that there are “twelve to twenty”
undocumented migrants in the United States as of 2008. The Pew Research Center estimated
between eleven million and twelve million unauthorized immigrant populations during that time.
See PASSEL & COHN, supra note 2. Kobach’s argument also does not recognize how some
undocumented migrants may have legal claims to remain. See Martin, supra note 40, at 1 (discussing
“twilight” statuses).
137 See generally Park, supra note 130.
135
136
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for the full costs of enforcement, including the social costs of policies that impact
society at large and on “mixed” immigration status families.138
Like immigration enforcement, criminal law enforcement routinely
reaches conduct that it does not eﬀectively deter. For those who lack the
ability or the incentives to comply with the law, or those who believe that
they are unlikely to get caught, enforcement eﬀorts can simply drive
prohibited behavior underground. This, in turn, can lead to more harmful
behavior.139 For instance, jurisdictions that take away the drivers’ licenses of
those with unpaid criminal justice debt may see an uptick in driving without
a license.140 Drug crackdowns may lead to a market for more dangerous
crimes, such as drug traﬃcking.141
Undocumented migrants who have lived and worked in the United States
long-term have much at stake in remaining. Many have U.S. citizen children
or other deep roots in the United States.142 Over time, connections to their
countries of origin may have withered, particularly given the diﬃculty of
returning to visit. Even if undocumented migrants are interested in returning
to their countries of origin, doing so is no easy task. Moving itself is expensive
and the prospect of re-establishing roots after over a decade away can be
daunting. These factors, along with the relatively low likelihood of detection,
make long-term undocumented migrants unlikely to return to their countries
of origin in signiﬁcant numbers.
Engaging in immigration enforcement designed to encourage “self-deportion”
also poses serious costs. The balance of this Part unpacks hidden costs, such as the
risk of creating more crime, undermining other law enforcement goals, and leading
populations to avoid reporting crime and engaging in other socially useful behavior.

138 See Hiroshi Motomura, We Asked for Workers, but Families Came: Time, Law, and the Family
in Immigration and Citizenship, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 103, 111 (2006) (discussing the impact of
immigration enforcement on mixed immigration status families); see also Hiroshi
Motomura, Making Legal: The DREAM Act, Birthright Citizenship, and Broad-Scale Legalization, 16
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1127, 1131 (2012) (summarizing common arguments for immigration reform
in the context of the Dream Act, including the need to integrate undocumented children).
139 See generally David Michael Jaros, Perfecting Criminal Markets, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1947
(2012) for an elaboration of this argument.
140 See, e.g., LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM:
HOW TRAFFIC COURTS DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 14 (2015) (noting that seventeen
percent of adult Californians have had a license suspension for failure to pay a debt and that
suspended license cases lead to further penalties when people drive without licenses to get to work).
141 Jaros, supra note 139, at 1947; see also William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV.
1871, 1873 (2000) (discussing how enforcement of certain “vice crimes” such as those enforced during
Prohibition “might prove self-defeating . . . by undermin[ing] the norms on which they rest”).
142 PASSEL & COHN, supra note 2, at 6.
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B. Hidden Enforcement Costs
Immigration scholars have tended to conﬁne their analyses of the “force
multiplier” phenomenon to immigration law. But the practice of delegating
enforcement discretion to an array of actors is an exceedingly common one in
criminal law enforcement as well. This Section explores structural parallels
to immigration enforcement in the context of workplace enforcement,
housing enforcement, and policing decisions. In each of these contexts, the
approach is designed to deter, but in practice, can carry serious hidden costs.
Work requirements and “nuisance ordinances” are important examples of
surveillance and enforcement delegation in the criminal law context. In each
regime, private actors have the ability to trigger serious harm, even if it is not
the most serious harm of long-term incarceration or deportation. As discussed
further below, both of these enforcement mechanisms carry related hidden
enforcement costs. They can undermine enforcement of other laws, and they
can create new forms of lawbreaking.
Work requirements are a common condition of probation.143 Some states
also compel parents to work if they owe child support.144 The rationales for
work requirements vary. In the child support context, work requirements are
imposed to try to deter so-called “deadbeat” parents from shirking support
obligations. In the probation context, work requirements were “[i]nitially
conceived as a way to reintegrate offenders into the community through a close
interpersonal relationship between [the enforcement] agent and offender.”145
The theory was that work itself—even when court-ordered and enforced with
the threat of prison—would serve a rehabilitative function. As Jonathan Simon
and Malcolm Feeley have observed, this rationale evolved over time to a
“managerial” one, with supervision of work requirements used as a
“monitoring technique” designed to “detect high rates of technical violations”
and lead to further discipline.146 In other words, work requirements are used
as one way to measure the supervised individual’s ability to “get with the
program” and to adhere to the conditions of court-ordered probation. Those
who are able to comply with work requirements are viewed as less risky; those
who are not are likely subject to further discipline.
Employers as well as probation officers monitor compliance. Probation
officers have the ability to make unannounced inspections in homes and
143 See Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism, 104
GEO. L. J. 291, 310 (2016) (“In nearly every jurisdiction in [this] study, working or going to school
is a central requirement of being on probation.”).
144 See United States v. Ballek, 170 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We conclude that child-support
awards fall within that narrow class of obligations that may be enforced by means of imprisonment
without violating the constitutional prohibition against slavery.”).
145 Feeley & Simon, supra note 131, at 455 n.12.
146 Id. at 455.
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workplaces.147 They have the ability to interview employers to assess
compliance. Employers in some cases also operate like probation officers, and
they report directly to courts. A judge in a Syracuse drug court put it this way:
“Your employer is now on a team of people who are reporting to me. When he
calls me up and tells me that you are late, or that you’re not there, I’m going
to send the cops out to arrest you.”148 Both the worker and the employer are
aware that the employer has the ability to trigger a serious penalty. The system
essentially “deputizes” the employer as a probation officer.149
On the surface, work requirements in the context of probation or child
support may appear to have nothing to do with work in the context of
undocumented migrants. As a matter of substantive law, these legal regimes
are opposites: probationers are required to work, while undocumented
migrants are prohibited from working. The parallels emerge not as a matter
of substantive law, but rather in terms of enforcement structure and its impact
on power dynamics within workplaces. In both contexts, workers are keenly
aware that their employers are not just employers; they are also enforcement
agents for a large and powerful enforcement bureaucracy, be it criminal law
or immigration law. In some cases, employers are likewise keenly aware of
their dual role as well. These dynamics alter workplace power dynamics by
giving employers an enormous amount of leverage over workers.
This dynamic creates law enforcement tradeoﬀs, meaning enforcement of
one law—the requirement that the supervised individual work—creates the
likelihood that other laws will not be enforced. Those subject to work
requirements have incentives not to report dangerous working conditions,
unlawful discrimination, or other forms of misconduct. In the immigration
context, exploitation of migrants—both unauthorized workers and legally
present guestworkers—is well documented.150 Similar opportunities for
exploitation occur with probationers, who are aware that they must “get to
work or go to jail.”151 The vast majority of aﬀected workers are low income,
with typical earnings of less than $1,000 per month.152 Work requirements can
create conditions that trigger a cycle of punishment, lost work, and

Doherty, supra note 143, at 296.
James L. Nolan, Jr., Therapeutic Adjudication, 39 SOC’Y, Jan.–Feb. 2002, at 29, 32.
NOAH ZATZ ET AL., GET TO WORK OR GO TO JAIL: WORKPLACE RIGHTS UNDER
THREAT 12 (2016); see also Noah D. Zatz, A New Peonage?: Pay, Work, or Go to Jail in Contemporary
Child Support Enforcement and Beyond, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 927, 933 (2016) (explaining how child
support enforcement eﬀectively makes debtors work or risk criminal sanctions).
150 See generally S. POVERTY LAW CTR., CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS
IN THE UNITED STATES (2013) (documenting, based on lawsuits and interviews, exploitation in
guestworker programs).
151 ZATZ ET AL., supra note 149, at 4.
152 Id. at 5.
147
148
149
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homelessness. The threat of jail time is not an idle one: an estimated 9000
people are currently incarcerated for violating work requirements.153
Work requirements, in eﬀect, give employers more bargaining power
relative to workers. Coercive employers can take advantage of these dynamics
by engaging in unlawful activity, such as wage theft, with the knowledge that
employees may be unlikely to complain.154 But even when employers act in
good faith, the threat of jail time or another signiﬁcant penalty can suppress
socially valuable activity. It can lead employees to avoid engaging in open
communication about work conditions.
Private actors also exercise quasi-criminal law enforcement power in
housing. Nuisance ordinances are a common example of the “force multiplier”
strategy for low-level cases. According to one estimate, approximately 2000
nuisance ordinances exist in the United States.155 They have received scant
attention by legal scholars, but they represent an important legal
intervention.156 Nuisance ordinances are designed to be a cost-eﬀective means
of removing tenants who cause disturbances in rental homes. Developed as a
response to overburdened 911 lines, the ordinances permit, or in some cases
require, landlords to evict tenants after calls to the police.157 If multiple 911
calls are placed from or about a particular residence in a certain timeframe,

Id.
In addition, undocumented workers who do speak out about unlawful activity may not be
entitled to all of the same remedies as other workers. See, e.g., Hoﬀman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151-53 (2002) (holding that an undocumented worker who was illegally ﬁred
for trying to organize a union was not entitled to the remedy of backpay because the worker was not
authorized to work in the United States).
155 Crime Free Multi-Housing: Keep Illegal Activity off Rental Property, INT’L CRIME FREE ASS’N,
http://www.crime-free-association.org/multi-housing.htm [https://perma.cc/9FQP-YYAD]. See
generally Gretchen Arnold & Megan Slusser, Silencing Women’s Voices: Nuisance Property Laws &
Battered Women, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 908 (2015); Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Unpolicing
the Urban Poor: Consequences of Third-Party Policing for Inner-City Women, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 117 (2012);
Peter Edelman, More Than a Nuisance, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 10, 2018),
https://newrepublic.com/article/147359/nuisance-laws-making-poverty-crime
[https://perma.cc/Y7G5-VN57].
156 In contrast to the dozens of articles on immigration-criminal law enforcement, nuisance
ordinances have been understudied. For an important forthcoming discussion of how “crime-free”
housing ordinances promote residential segregation, see Deborah Archer, The New Housing
Segregation: The Jim Crow Eﬀects of Crime-Free Housing Ordinances, 117 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019). For additional literature on nuisance enforcement, see generally Amanda K. Gavin,
Note, Chronic Nuisance Ordinances: Turning Victims of Domestic Violence into “Nuisances” in the Eyes of
Municipalities, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 257 (2014); Salim Katach, Note, A Tenant’s Procedural Due
Process Right in Chronic Nuisance Ordinance Jurisdictions, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 875 (2015); and Sarah
Swan, Comment, Home Rules, 64 DUKE L.J. 823 (2015).
157 Desmond & Valdez, supra note 155, at 121.
153
154
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the landlord will receive a letter from the police indicating that the subject
property is a “nuisance” that must be “abated,” including by eviction.158
The particulars of the ordinances vary by jurisdiction: some localities send
nuisance abatement letters after three or more 911 calls in a thirty-day window,
while others require only two or more calls within a one-year window.159
Depending on the locality, police have broad discretion to categorize conduct as
a nuisance. For instance, some ordinances include “crime free” provisions, which
either require or permit evictions if a tenant or guest “allegedly engages in
criminal activity on or near the property, regardless of whether the resident was
a victim.”160 Others are broadly worded to permit eviction on the basis of
offenses such as littering and excessive noise.161 Landlords risk penalties—“fines,
property forfeiture, or even incarceration”—if they do not “abate the nuisance,”
such as by evicting problem tenants.162
As with immigration, nuisance enforcement is designed to expand the
enforcement net. Landlords are expected to deal with oﬀenses deemed
nuisances precisely because they do not merit police resources.163 Yet
downgrading the oﬀense creates high stakes for tenants, who have much to
lose by eviction. In expensive cities, tenants face extraordinary diﬃculty in
ﬁnding aﬀordable housing. To put it mildly, it is a landlord’s market. Over
eleven million families spend over half their income on housing, and some
spend up to eighty percent of their income on housing.164 Evicted tenants
face the possibility that they may be unable to ﬁnd alternative housing and
become homeless.165 Evicted families with children have a particularly hard
time ﬁnding other homes.166 Moving itself is not cheap; it can be cost158 See, e.g., Arnold & Slusser, supra note 155, at 910 (describing such procedures in St. Louis’s
nuisance ordinance).
159 Desmond & Valdez, supra note 155, at 122 (discussing Milwaukee’s ordinance, which
classiﬁes a premises that has generated more than two 911 calls within thirty days as a nuisance);
Arnold & Slusser, supra note 155, at 910 (noting that the St. Louis, Missouri ordinance required
landlords to abate a nuisance after two calls to 911 in a one-year period).
160 U.S. DEP’T. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL GUIDANCE ON
APPLICATION OF FAIR HOUSING ACT STANDARDS TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF LOCAL NUISANCE
& CRIME-FREE HOUSING ORDINANCES AGAINST VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 5-6 (2016).
161 Desmond & Valdez, supra note 155, at 122.
162 Id. at 120.
163 See id. at 119-20 (describing how nuisance ordinances arose in response to police being
unable to respond to the volume of 911 calls).
164 See Pam Fessler, Welcome to Rent Court, Where Tenants Can Face a Tenuous Fate, NPR (Mar. 28,
2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/03/28/470522433/welcome-to-rent-court-where-tenants-can-face-atenuous-fate [https://perma.cc/96F9-FGV6].
165 Id.
166 See Matthew Desmond & Carl Gershenson, Who Gets Evicted? Assessing Individual,
Neighborhood, & Network Factors, 62 SOC. SCI. RES. 362, 372 (2017) (presenting an empirical study
ﬁnding evidence of discrimination the basis of family status and theorizing that landlords may have
an interest in “replacing large households with smaller ones, or families with childless tenants . . .
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prohibitive for those with little disposable income. For all these reasons,
tenants have powerful incentives to avoid triggering nuisance enforcement,
even when it comes at the expense of not reporting crime.
Nuisance enforcement alters power dynamics between tenants, the police,
and landlords in far-reaching ways. It can create law enforcement tradeoﬀs,
meaning that nuisance enforcement results in other laws not being enforced.
And it can create the conditions that allow serious forms of crime to ﬂourish,
precisely because tenants have limited practical ability to call the police.
All tenants are entitled to police protection, but nuisance enforcement
creates an incentive not to report crime. It has a chilling effect on the reporting
and prosecution of domestic violence. Some domestic violence victims make
the rational decision to forgo police protection in order to avoid eviction. In
one widely reported example, Lakisha Briggs chose not to call 911 after being
assaulted in her home because her landlord had warned her that any additional
calls to 911 would result in her eviction.167 While Briggs’ example is unusual in
that it received media attention, it is not an isolated one. An empirical study
by Matthew Desmond and Nicol Valdez over a two-year period in Milwaukee
found that domestic violence calls represented one-third of all citations.168
Nuisance enforcement also encourages some landlords to interfere with
private living arrangements, with some landlords directly informing tenants
not to call 911 except in life-threatening situations or informing them to oust
boyfriends who cause domestic disturbances.169 Nuisance enforcement can
thus chill reporting and prosecution of other types of crime.
Absent the ordinance, a landlord would have little apparent incentive to
regulate a tenant’s calls to the police. Nuisance enforcement, however, creates
incentives for landlords to quell calls to 911. It places landlords in a position of
[b]ecause children can cause added stress on property, disturb neighbors, and attract unwanted
scrutiny by child welfare agents or law enforcement oﬃcers”).
167 A neighbor called 911 to report the assault and to seek medical attention for Briggs, who ended up
being airlifted to the hospital. Afterward, she was served with an eviction notice. Erik Eckholm, Victims’
TIMES
(Aug.
16,
2013),
Dilemma:
911
Calls
Can
Bring
Eviction,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/17/us/victims-dilemma-911-calls-can-bring-eviction.html
[https://perma.cc/2CWK-2Q5V]; Briggs v. Borough of Norristown et al., ACLU (Sept. 18, 2014),
https://www.aclu.org/cases/briggs-v-borough-norristown-et-al?redirect=womens-rights/briggs-v-boroughnorristown-et-al [https://perma.cc/W2LN-PR72].
168 See Desmond & Valdez, supra note 155, at 131, which also quotes a landlord informing tenants,
You can’t be calling the police because your boyfriend hit you again. They’re not your
big babysitter. It happened last week, and you threw him out. But then you let him
back in, and it happens again and again. Either learn from the ﬁrst experience or, you
know, leave. Don’t take him back and get hit because you tell him, I don’t know, “I
don’t want to sleep with you.”
Other landlords reported explicitly informing tenants that they would begin eviction proceedings if
the tenants called the police in “non–life threatening” situations. Id. at 134.
169 Id. at 131.
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power relative to tenants. Landlords may use that power in a way that deters
people from seeking police protection. These dynamics unfold against a
backdrop of legal regulation where tenants are often practically unable to assert
their legal rights, given understaffed housing courts and lack of access to
counsel in housing court.170
Like regulations aimed at deterring unlawful immigration, nuisance
enforcement also facilitates unlawful discrimination. Desmond and Valdez
found that “properties located in black neighborhoods were more likely to
receive nuisance citations for domestic violence” even after controlling for
relevant factors, such as the overall presence of domestic violence calls.171 “All
else being equal, a property located in an 80 percent black
neighborhood . . . was over 3.5 times more likely to receive a nuisance
citation” than other properties.172 Thus, expanded enforcement discretion also
expands the opportunities for racial discrimination.
In addition to private actors, police of course also exercise signiﬁcant
discretion. Arrest decisions can trigger serious harm, even for low-level
arrests. This can lead to “system avoidance”—an unwillingness of those who
have prior contacts with the criminal justice system to engage with certain
key institutions, such as police.173
Undocumented migrants are far from the only population with good
reason to avoid minor contact with the police. Probationers face the
possibility of probation revocation for minor law enforcement encounters,
such as speeding or a parking ticket—or even a mere complaint about a
potential legal violation.174 Those who owe criminal justice debt can end up
in jail because of their inability to pay.175 This dynamic unfolds in two ways.
First, the criminal process is used to punish failure to pay certain types of
170 See, e.g., Fessler, supra note 164 (observing that many tenants in housing court are not
represented by a lawyer and do not know what their rights are).
171 Desmond & Valdez, supra note 155, at 132.
172 Id. at 132.
173 Brayne, supra note 14, at 368.
174 Doherty, supra note 143, at 301.
175 This dynamic unfolds in spite of the prohibition against debtors’ prisons. See Williams v.
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970) (holding that imprisonment due to a prisoner’s inability to pay
a debt violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); see also Bearden v. Georgia,
461 U.S. 660, 668-69, 672-73 (1983) (holding that the practice of imprisoning a probationer who was
unable to pay oﬀ his legal debts violates equal protection). But see Laura I Appleman, Nickel and
Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice in the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1489-90
(2016) (describing how states have informally re-created debtors’ prisons); Joseph Shapiro, Supreme
Court Ruling Not Enough to Prevent Debtors Prisons, NPR (May 21, 2014),
https://www.npr.org/2014/05/21/313118629/supreme-court-ruling-not-enough-to-prevent-debtorsprisons [https://perma.cc/X7VV-BSM6] (explaining that a quarter of people in a county jail for
misdemeanor oﬀenses over a four-month period in 2013 were there because they had not paid court
ﬁnes and fees).
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debt, such as child support and penal debt. Second, those who owe child
support and penal debt—broadly deﬁned as “debt stemming from civil and
criminal penalties and ﬁnes, prosecution costs, court fees, usage fees, and
interest”—ﬁnd that unlike many other categories of debt, these debts are not
dischargeable in bankruptcy court.176 Thus, debtors have restricted remedies
if they are unable to pay.
For debtors, these dynamics magnify the stakes of arrest. Unpaid debt
triggers a downward spiral. It may trigger arrest warrants, which can lead to
jail time or suspension of a driver’s license, which in turn can lead to loss of
work and additional debt.177 The cycle then repeats itself.
This is the pattern that unfolded for Walter L. Scott, who was shot in the
back and killed when he ﬂed from police in 2015. Scott ﬂed after he was pulled
over for a broken taillight; he was not involved in any criminal activity. Scott,
however, had good reason to avoid arrest. Scott’s child support debt had
previously led to an outstanding criminal warrant. At the time of his fatal
encounter with the police, he had already experienced losing what he
described as the “best job [he] ever had” when unpaid child support led to a
two-week stint in jail.178 His awareness of the possibility of being jailed again
due to the debt may have led him to ﬂee from the police, which in turn, led
to a police oﬃcer using deadly force. His case is not an anomaly. According
to a recent report, “[i]n major cities, 5% of all fathers are incarcerated for
falling behind on child support.”179
These enforcement choices may create lasting incentives to avoid the
police and other institutions that are perceived as participating in surveillance.
Sociologist Sarah Brayne found that those with prior contact with the criminal
justice system avoid interactions with “surveilling” institutions, meaning
institutions that keep formal records, such as banks, hospitals, or the police.180
Brayne coined the term “system avoidance” to describe the pattern of
avoidance with institutions that keep records (that put people “in the system”),
176 Abbye Atkinson, Consumer Bankruptcy, Nondischargeability, and Penal Debt, 70 VAND. L.
REV. 917, 919 (2017) (footnote omitted); see also Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 1706, 1727 (2015) (describing usage fees in the criminal context); Zatz, supra note 149, at 931
(explaining that unlike private debts, criminal justice debts are not dischargeable in bankruptcy and
can result in imprisonment for nonpayment).
177 See Brandon L. Garrett & William Crozier, Driver’s License Suspension in North Carolina 2
(Duke Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2019-27), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3355599
(finding that fifteen percent of North Carolinians had their driver’s licenses suspended and that most
suspensions were for failure to appear in court and summarizing research showing that the suspension
of a driver’s license has a negative impact on employment).
178 Frances Robles & Shaila Dewan, Skip Child Support. Go to Jail. Lose Job. Repeat., N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/us/skip-child-support-go-to-jail-lose-jobrepeat.html [https://perma.cc/2SWD-B4QZ].
179 ZATZ ET AL., supra note 149, at 2.
180 Brayne, supra note 14, at 368.
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and she argues that the rise in surveillance mechanisms related to criminal
justice has led to a “concomitant increase in efforts to evade” that
surveillance.181 Those with prior criminal law contact avoided institutions like
schools, employers, or hospitals, but not community organizations that did not
collect data, such as churches.182 Prior negative contact with the criminal
justice system also diminishes other forms of social engagement. Sociologist
and legal scholar Sara Greene found that prior encounters with the criminal
justice system led to diminished engagement with the civil legal system, for
instance, in the form of not seeking civil legal services.183
System avoidance is harmful precisely because it deters so many socially
useful interactions. Those who avoid access to recordkeeping institutions, such
as banks, hospitals, or the police, are more likely to be at risk of crime or
adverse health care outcomes. Communities as a whole are also less well off
when large classes of people are unable to access medical care or report crime.
Situating immigration enforcement in the context of other quasi-criminal
enforcement mechanisms shows the reach of informal mechanisms of
enforcement. In both systems, routine interactions with private and public
actors can trigger escalated penalties. In the immigration context, as in the
criminal law context, these dynamics constitute an important type of
enforcement, even if it is not the most severe type of enforcement. Both
systems create costs that emerge from power imbalances between the
regulated population and other actors.
The comparison to criminal law also reveals why escalated enforcement will
not necessarily lead those present without authorization to make a rational
decision to return to their country of origin. Those subject to ongoing surveillance
and low-level criminal law enforcement do not systemically leave neighborhoods
where they are disproportionately subject to police stops or nuisance enforcement.
The costs of moving may be prohibitive or they may lack desirable options for
relocation. Instead, some regulated populations avoid contact with surveilling
institutions in order to minimize the likelihood of escalated enforcement.
Criminal law comparisons also help to illuminate the costs of delegating
enforcement discretion to a host of diﬀerent actors. This enforcement
structure creates both incentives and opportunities for key actors to abuse
their positions of power by engaging in discrimination or exploitation. In
addition, even when enforcement agents do not seek to take advantage of
vulnerable populations, awareness of surveillance and the possibility of
enforcement can lead to outcomes like system avoidance. What matters are
181
182
183

Id. at 367-68.
Id. at 385.
Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1263, 1267 (2016).
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the perceptions of how enforcement mechanisms work, not only how
enforcement is actually exercised in any given case.
IV. RESTRUCTURING IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
Immigration enforcement reaches well beyond those who are removed; it
also aﬀects the vast majority who remain. It does so by creating or
exacerbating structural power imbalances between undocumented migrants
and others. Given these dynamics, how should enforcement unfold?
This Part considers how to conduct immigration enforcement given that the
vast majority of undocumented migrants will not be removed. It first evaluates
the limits of procedural solutions and considers “sanctuary” policies as an attempt
to ameliorate some of the costs of system avoidance. It then considers how to make
interior immigration enforcement choices in light of the hidden costs of
enforcement. It uses insights from misdemeanor reform to evaluate preliminarily
how to better account for the costs of conducting interior enforcement.
A. Procedural Remedies
Procedural remedies—meaning remedies aimed at improving the process
implemented in immigration courts—tend to loom large in immigration
enforcement debates.184 That is because the procedures that accompany
removal proceedings are grossly inadequate to their stated purpose. Children,
for instance, appear without lawyers and represent themselves in immigration
court.185 The majority of those who are formally removed never actually have
the opportunity for adjudication before an immigration judge because their
cases are disposed of in a variety of “summary” or “expedited” proceedings.186
Noncitizens in criminal proceedings also face barriers to making fully
informed plea agreements. Criminal defense attorneys are now required to
inform defendants who are lawfully present if their pleas will trigger mandatory
deportation.187 Yet there is no similar obligation for attorneys in the many cases
where criminal pleas may potentially trigger deportation but deportation is not
mandatory.188 Thus, in both criminal and in immigration proceedings,
184 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 34, at 183 (discussing critiques of immigration court and noting that given
the inadequate procedures in immigration adjudication, it “logically follows that the lion’s share of reform
proposals have focused on improving the law, policies, and resources associated with the immigration courts”).
185 Jerry Markon, Can a 3-Year Old Represent Herself in Immigration Court? This Judge Thinks So.,
WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/can-a-3-yearold-represent-herself-in-immigration-court-this-judge-thinks-so/2016/03/03/5be59a32-db25-11e5-925f1d10062cc82d_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.7b93383bb014 [https://perma.cc/EBD6-Z2KP].
186 See Koh, supra note 34, at 183-86 (noting that approximately half of removal orders were in absentia
in 2015 and describing how “various enforcement measures . . . effectively bypass the immigration courts”).
187 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010).
188 Id.
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improved procedures—designed with the aim of ensuring that noncitizens have
the opportunity for adjudication, access to counsel, information about their
remedies, and translation services—can play an important role. Indeed, access
to counsel itself makes a significant difference in the likelihood of removal.189
Likewise, the ability to appear before a judge in person, as opposed to via
remote adjudication, also appears to affect outcomes.190
As valuable as improved procedures would be for those who are placed in
removal proceedings, they would do relatively little work at the bottom of the
immigration enforcement pyramid. Here, criminal cases are illustrative as
well. Criminal procedure does considerably less work in the context of
misdemeanors as compared to felonies. Due to well-documented funding
deﬁcits for public defenders, long delays in misdemeanor courts, and steep
collateral consequences triggered by arrest alone, criminal defendants often
choose to waive all procedural rights and plead guilty.191 They also routinely
do so without the knowledge that minor convictions can carry lasting
penalties, such as by posing barriers to employment.192
Procedural remedies—namely, adopting important criminal procedure
protections in immigration proceedings—do not oﬀer a meaningful solution
to the unintended consequences of interior immigration enforcement. The
vast majority of undocumented migrants do not experience removal; what
they instead experience is uncertainty about how and when immigration
enforcement may unfold. Procedural protections can do little to address this
type of uncertainty, particularly when undocumented migrants are aware that
they run the risk of putting themselves on the radar for escalated immigration
enforcement if they come forward and seek legal protections. Thus, while
improved procedures could be valuable at the tip of the immigration

Eagly & Shafer, supra note 33, at 9.
Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. L. REV. 933, 937 (2015).
See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN
A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 30-33 (1979) (explaining that the “process costs”—the hassle of being
a defendant in misdemeanor court—outweigh the formal punishment); Albert W.
Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining
System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 953 (1983) (observing that “[a] misdemeanor defendant, even if
innocent, usually is well advised to waive every available procedural protection (including the right
to counsel) and to plead guilty at the earliest possible opportunity,” given that the perceived beneﬁts
of an acquittal are outweighed by the costs of seeking adjudication); Joe, supra note 44, at 743
(discussing funding shortages for public defenders).
192 See, e.g., JAMES JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 4 (2015) (“[C]riminal records
today are widely used to assess, sort, and categorize people in such diverse contexts as immigration,
employment, housing, university admissions, voting, possessing ﬁrearms, serving on a jury, and
qualifying for social welfare beneﬁts.”); Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment Law, 39 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2265, 2267 (2018) (discussing how “criminal conviction, charge, and even arrest” can make
it diﬃcult for individuals to “ﬁnd[] and keep[] a job”).
189
190
191
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enforcement pyramid, they would have relatively little impact on the vast
majority who remain present long-term.
B. “Sanctuary” as a Managerial Strategy
“Sanctuary” has become a ﬂashpoint in conversations about immigration
reform. Some opponents depict sanctuary jurisdictions as soft on crime, while
some proponents connect immigrant-protective policies to a principled
opposition to deportation.193 In practice, sanctuary policies in criminal justice
do not necessarily reﬂect a robust commitment to immigration expansionism
or integration. While the substance of certain policies may well be motivated
by a desire to welcome noncitizens, they should also be understood as an
attempt to make policing decisions in a way that reﬂects law enforcement
goals. As such, sanctuary policies with respect to criminal justice cannot be
understood apart from underlying policing practices.
“Sanctuary” is an imperfect umbrella term for a range of distinct
approaches to immigration enforcement, including policies outside the
context of law enforcement.194 Some policies prohibit police from inquiring
about immigration status when it is unrelated to any suspected criminal
violation.195 Other sanctuary policies govern information sharing with ICE,
such as by prohibiting local law enforcement from sharing information about
the timing of criminal case dispositions with ICE, restricting ICE access to
local jails to conduct interviews, or otherwise limiting the conditions under
which local police will comply with ICE detainer requests.196 The stated
rationales for noncompliance also vary, and they range from the locality’s
interest in welcoming immigrants to its interest in not paying for federal
immigration enforcement eﬀorts.197

193 See, e.g., Trevor George Gardner, Immigrant Sanctuary as the ‘Old Normal’; A Brief History of
Police Federalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2019) (collecting quotes from government oﬃcials
criticizing sanctuary policies as a “gift” to gangs); Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New
Immigration Federalism, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1197, 1199, 1205 (observing that the modern
sanctuary movement diﬀers in important ways from its namesake in the church-led sanctuary
movement of the 1980s).
194 For recent contributions to the literature, see generally Armacost, supra note 193, at 1205;
Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cities After
Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13 (2016); Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding
“Sanctuary Cities”, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703 (2018); Hiroshi Motomura, Arguing About Sanctuary, 52 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 435, 437 (2018) (observing that “sanctuary has come to mean many things” and
arguing that it is important to “distinguish decisions to intervene aﬃrmatively in immigration
enforcement from decisions not to intervene aﬃrmatively but instead to decline involvement”).
195 Lasch et al., supra note 194, at 1707.
196 Id.
197 Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 245, 288, 293 (2016).
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Some sanctuary policies recognize that immigration enforcement does not
take place in a vacuum; decisions by unauthorized migrants to avoid the
police have feedback eﬀects on crime control.198 Police have reason to worry
if policies deter the reporting of serious crimes and damage their
relationships with policed communities.199 Consistent with this concern,
some local prosecutors have stated that they will avoid prosecuting low-level
cases that trigger disproportionate penalties.200
In taking this approach, sanctuary policies are not unique to the
immigration context. Some localities that have adopted immigrant-protective
policies also take similar measures in other cases where low-level convictions
trigger disproportionate consequences. For instance, prosecutors in some
jurisdictions take a similar approach to minor convictions that have a direct
impact on a defendant’s ability to work or go to school.201
Sanctuary is thus partially an adaptive response to immigration
enforcement decisions that cut against a law enforcement agency’s
institutional interests. Law enforcement agencies that take this approach do
not necessarily oppose immigration enforcement at large; rather, they oppose
enforcement in a way that alters or undercuts their own objectives.
Sanctuary policies hold promise in part because of the demographics of
undocumented migration. Undocumented migrants are concentrated in
particular localities in the United States. The majority of unauthorized
residents live in six states and in twenty metropolitan areas.202 California alone
is home to over two million unauthorized migrants.203 Sanctuary policies in
areas with a relatively high concentration of undocumented migrants thus have

198 See Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91
IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1461 (2006) (discussing how the threat of deportation may prevent noncitizens
from reporting crime).
199 See Laura Sullivan, Police, Banks Help Undocumented Workers Shake ‘Walking ATM’ Label,
NPR (Jan. 20, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/01/20/263505387/police-banks-help-undocumentedworkers-shake-walking-atm-label [https://perma.cc/SR9B-ECYZ] (reporting on the targeting of
undocumented immigrants by thieves); see also Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of
Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054 (2017) (discussing consequences of lack of trust in the police).
200 Eagly, supra note 197, at 306; Jain, supra note 28, at 1219-20.
201 Jain, supra note 28, at 1216.
202 See Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, 20 Metro Areas Are Home to Six-in-Ten Unauthorized
Immigrants in U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/09/usmetro-areas-unauthorized-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/V4JQ-554G] (noting that the New York and
Los Angeles metro areas contain unauthorized immigrant populations of 1,200,000 and 1,000,000,
respectively); U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Population Estimates, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 6, 2016),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/interactives/unauthorized-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/N8Q5-6G7Q]
(Nov. 6, 2016) (“California has by far the largest number of unauthorized immigrants, about 2.3 million
in 2014. About six-in-ten unauthorized immigrants live in the six states with the largest populations of
unauthorized immigrants—California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York and Texas.”).
203 See U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Population Estimates, supra note 202.
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the potential to significantly impact how large portions of the undocumented
population experience contact with the criminal justice system.
As a regulatory strategy, however, sanctuary is imperfect. Sanctuary
jurisdictions do not opt out of the ﬁngerprint sharing aspect of Secure
Communities. Instead, they reduce the eﬃcacy of Secure Communities, such
as by limiting communication with federal immigration enforcement oﬃcials
and by refusing to honor federal detainer requests. They thus oﬀer no safe
harbors from deportation. Sanctuary jurisdictions also exclude important
categories of migrants from their policies. For instance, Chicago’s
“Welcoming City” ordinance as a general matter prevents police from
inquiring about immigration status, and it restricts information sharing with
federal immigration enforcement oﬃcials.204 But there are important
exceptions: the restrictions do not apply if the arrested individual has open
arrests, prior felony convictions, or appears in a gang database.205 The
exceptions are wide-ranging, and they also create uncertainty about who
exactly is likely to be shielded. If undocumented migrants lack knowledge
about the particulars of how sanctuary policies work, they may not view such
policies as a meaningful intervention.
More fundamentally, sanctuary also cannot be understood apart from
underlying policing practices. Some police departments and local
governments have identified themselves as adhering to “sanctuary” policies
while at the same time pursuing policing practices that necessarily place a
number of people on the radar for immigration enforcement. Police
departments that make high-volume, low-level arrests in the context of public
order policing necessarily conduct immigration screening on arrested
individuals. For low-level offenses, ones that could be regulated by means
other than criminal law, this raises the question: why arrest in the first place?206
In addition, the expressive message of “sanctuary” may not carry much
weight if communities view underlying policing practices themselves as
unjustiﬁed. In jurisdictions such as Baltimore, New York, and Chicago,
among others—those with a well-documented and recent history of police
misconduct—sanctuary policies may do little on the ground given the history
of distrust between communities and police.207
CHI., ILL., CODE §§ 2-173-005, 2-173-020, 2-173-030 (2019).
Id. at § 2-173-042. For a discussion about potential overbreadth with gang member
provisions, see Chacón, supra note 97, at 320.
206 Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 316-17 (2016).
207 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976, 986 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (discussing federal
officers conducting sting operations in Chicago as “adopt[ing] a narrative tinged with racial overtones”);
Floyd v. City of N.Y., 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting “tension” in New York City
over stop-and-frisks that primarily affected certain racial minorities); Tracey L. Meares, Programming
Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 159, 175 (2015) (discussing the systemic impact of stop-and-frisk, including “[t]he fact that racial
204
205
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Finally, given that police are far from the only agents that act as
immigration enforcers, sanctuary policies in criminal justice can only do so
much. Rose Villazor and Pratheepan Gulasekaram discuss a more holistic
approach of a “sanctuary network” where diﬀerent entities—local
governments, universities, schools, police, or employers—work together to
coordinate and apply sanctuary policies.208 Taking this approach oﬀers one
potential, albeit imperfect, mechanism for reducing some of the undesired
costs of immigration enforcement.
C. Evaluating the Costs of Enforcement
The current structure of immigration enforcement reflects the assumption
that delegating enforcement discretion to public and private actors lowers the
costs of enforcement. This assumption, however, may not hold true if the
hidden costs of enforcement are also taken into account. In the low-level
criminal law enforcement context, an important and growing body of work
evaluates the full costs of seemingly minor contact with the criminal justice
system, and it argues for a broader recognition of these difficult-to-quantify
costs in criminal law enforcement decisions. This Section draws on
misdemeanor reform as a model for assessing hidden costs relating to
enforcement, including costs to private actors and to society at large.
To be clear, cost–beneﬁt analysis is of course not the only factor that
drives enforcement choices. Immigration enforcement choices should be
guided by the substantive question of who ought to be recognized as a
member. Immigration scholarship thus unsurprisingly tends to focus on
membership theory.209 Immigration scholar Hiroshi Motomura employs the
concept of “immigration as aﬃliation” to develop the argument that
immigration law ought to recognize long-standing membership ties.210 In the
context of “Dreamers,” Motomura writes that undocumented migrants are
“already part of American society in many ways” given that they typically
“arrived at a young age and in the distant past . . . [and have] had little or no
contact with their parents’ countries of origin.”211 This theory of membership
is grounded in a recognition of associational ties. Those who are here longterm, who arrive as children, and who make important contributions to U.S.
communities deserve to be put on a path to citizenship.
minorities in cities disproportionately encounter police in both constitutional and unconstitutional
contexts fuels those minorities’ perceptions of the illegitimacy of the police”).
208 Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks, 103 MINN. L. REV.
1209, 1214, 1217 (2019).
209 See, e.g., Kit Johnson, Theories of Immigration Law, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1211, 1214 (2014)
(“Immigration law is fundamentally about membership in a political state.”).
210 Motomura, Making Legal, supra note 138, at 1131.
211 Id.
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Membership theory provides one argument for immigration reform—
speciﬁcally, a legalization program to recognize the status of certain
undocumented migrants. A conceptually distinct argument, but one that
leads to the same conclusion, relates to recognizing the full costs of
enforcement. To the extent interior immigration enforcement has been
driven by cost–beneﬁt analysis, it should at minimum take into account the
full costs of enforcement.
In the misdemeanor context, both substantive arguments about the proper
scope of criminalization as well as a recognition of the full costs of
enforcement have played a role in reform. Consider marijuana
decriminalization: one substantive argument is that adult marijuana use, like
adult alcohol use, is not the proper subject for criminal law enforcement. Yet
another argument is that seemingly low-cost enforcement eﬀorts actually
carry steep hidden costs.212 In a variety of contexts—marijuana reform, bail
reform, and misdemeanor reform—some who might otherwise support
criminalization have supported decriminalization in light of evidence that the
full costs of low-level enforcement are too high.213 Similarly, recognizing the
full costs of immigration enforcement is an important consideration when
evaluating whether interior immigration enforcement actually meets its
objectives. The costs of immigration enforcement are diﬃcult to quantify, but
they reach well beyond just the costs of deportation. My aim here is to
illuminate certain systemic costs and to set the stage for further work that
considers these and other costs.
One set of costs are the social costs relating to enforcement. System
avoidance is pernicious because it can be far-reaching and long-lasting. The
concern is not only that individuals who are subject to enforcement are
unwilling to report crimes when victimized. Rather, disengagement with
socially valuable institutions can go much deeper, and it can harm
communities as a whole.214

212 See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Leveraging Marijuana Reform to Enhance Expungement Practices,
30 FED. SENT’G R. 305, 306-08 (2018) (summarizing a history of marijuana reform eﬀorts, including
reforms driven by research showing that marijuana criminalization disproportionately harmed
African American communities and carried signiﬁcant collateral consequences).
213 For a discussion of misdemeanor decriminalization, as well as a discussion of the distinction
between decriminalization and full legalization, see generally Alexandra Natapoﬀ, Misdemeanor
Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055 (2015). For a discussion of the hidden costs of bail, see
Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1405-06 (2017), which
develops a “taxonomy of the major costs and beneﬁts of pre-trial detention,” including “private costs
to defendants, such as the loss of liberty and the loss of future earnings, as well as externalities
imposed on families and members of the community.”
214 See Bell, supra note 199, at 2086-87 (arguing that even when communities are willing to
obey the police, there are hidden costs to communities from policing decisions).
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In the misdemeanor context, recent research shows that low-level policing
practices exert a social cost in promoting segregation. In particular, the
perception that African Americans are disproportionately likely to be arrested
for low-level violations in predominantly white spaces plays a role in
perpetrating residential segregation.215 Low-level policing practices in New
York and Ferguson had a disproportionate impact on racial minorities who
“were out of place: people who had crossed racial boundaries and entered
places where other races or ethnicities were the dominant presence.”216
Minorities, in turn, report avoiding places where they perceive a
disproportionate risk of being stopped.217
While this is an area ripe for further research, recent studies show a
similar eﬀect by immigration enforcement in promoting patterns of
residential segregation.218 A recent study in Dallas, Texas, found that
undocumented families perceived primarily Latino neighborhoods as
desirable due to the perception that Latinos could better “blend in” and avoid
detection.219 Perceptions about immigration enforcement also led to
reluctance to venture to unknown neighborhoods, and this reluctance
extended to U.S. citizen children.220
Interior immigration enforcement can also diminish the potential for
integration and access to education. This trend is particularly signiﬁcant for
children. A rising proportion of U.S. school children live in mixed
immigration–status families. Approximately 3,900,000 students enrolled in
public and private school in grades kindergarten through twelve—or slightly
over seven percent of the total enrolled student population—have at least one
undocumented parent.221 The vast majority of these students—3.2 million—

215 Jeffrey Fagan & Elliott Ash, New Policing, New Segregation: From Ferguson to New York, 106
GEO. L.J. ONLINE 33, 119 (2017) (drawing on data from Ferguson to show how “[p]olicing helps to lock
people in place both spatially and economically”); Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing:
Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2402 (2017) (discussing
how policing of minority communities can create and reinforce “social and racial stratification”).
216 Fagan & Ash, supra note 215, at 123.
217 See Bell, supra note 199, at 2095 (describing one individual’s avoidance of a West Baltimore
mall due to several hostile encounters with police).
218 Asad L. Asad & Eva Rosen, Hiding Within Racial Hierarchies: How Undocumented Immigrants
Make Residential Decisions in an American City, J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 1, 2 (2018),
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1532787 (offering an interview-based account to “show how
[undocumented] families perceive certain neighborhoods to be ‘off-limits,’ not only because of financial
constraints, explicit legal impediments to their tenure, or individual racial preferences, but also because
they perceive them as untenable for households who hope to avoid punitive contact with law
enforcement”).
219 Id. at 2.
220 Id. at 11.
221 Jeﬀrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Children of Unauthorized Immigrants Represent Rising Share
of K-12 Students, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
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are U.S. citizens.222 Thus, immigration enforcement policies that chill
undocumented parents from venturing into diﬀerent neighborhoods can play
a lasting role in diminishing integration and access to education.
Interior immigration enforcement also creates signiﬁcant trauma. This is
particularly acute for children who experience separation. Immigration
enforcement decisions should take into account the long-term public health
consequences of trauma or stress relating to enforcement.223
System avoidance also chills contact with valuable institutions. This goes
beyond disengagement with the police. It may also diminish contact with
institutions like hospitals and banks.224 A recent empirical study of the impact
of Secure Communities suggests similar spillover eﬀects of immigration
enforcement on Hispanic-headed U.S. citizen families, ﬁnding that U.S.
citizens were less likely to apply for certain public beneﬁts if they had family
members who were undocumented and lived in an area where they perceived
high levels of immigration enforcement activity.225 Some enforcement actions
deter students from attending school after high proﬁle enforcement
actions.226 Students who do attend school may become withdrawn from
administrators and teachers if they are aware that information shared with
school personnel may be shared with ICE.227
Private actors and localities also bear costs related to enforcement. Some
localities oppose undertaking immigration enforcement responsibilities

tank/2016/11/17/children-of-unauthorized-immigrants-represent-rising-share-of-k-12-students/
[https://perma.cc/HEC4-J9HQ].
222 See id. (“The vast majority of students with at least one unauthorized immigrant parent—3.2
million, or 5.9% of total enrollment in 2014—were U.S.-born children and thus U.S. citizens at birth.”).
223 Villazor, supra note 104, at 45 (describing how the fear of deportation has a powerful impact
on youth whose parents are deportable).
224 Brayne, supra note 14, at 368.
225 Marcella Alsan & Crystal Yang, Fear and the Safety Net: Evidence from Secure Communities ii
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24731, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24731
[https://perma.cc/G9K6-R7S9] (finding “significant declines in SNAP and ACA enrollment”).
226 Catherine E. Shoichet, Ice Raided a Meatpacking Plant. More than 500 Kids Missed School the
Next Day., CNN (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/12/us/tennessee-immigration-raidschools-impact/index.html [https://perma.cc/G5NK-HSU8] (reporting that ﬁve percent of a school
district’s student population did not come to school the day after a workplace raid during which ICE
arrested ninety-seven immigrants).
227 See Combating Gang Violence on Long Island: Shutting Down the MS Pipeline: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Counterterrorism & Intelligence of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 115th Cong. 10–12 (2017)
(statement of Angel Melendez, ICE Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent-in-Charge,
N.Y.) (describing Operation Matador as a way to disrupt gang recruitment of youth); Hannah Dreier,
How a Crackdown on MS-13 Caught Up Innocent High School Students, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/27/magazine/ms13-deportation-ice.html [https://perma.cc/CKS9ZWWZ] (describing Operation Matador’s operation in high schools).
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because of the additional costs it imposes on localities.228 Some localities
oppose undertaking immigration enforcement responsibilities because of the
additional cost imposed.229 In addition to discrete financial costs, there are also
less tangible financial costs within workplaces. Regardless of how any particular
employer exercises immigration enforcement discretion, undocumented
migrants have reason to view employers as surveilling institutions and to avoid
engaging in activity that draws their attention. To the extent interior
immigration enforcement is based on deterrence theory, it should take into
account the full costs of these enforcement policies and evaluate whether the
benefits are worth the costs.
CONCLUSION
Immigration enforcement in the interior is often conceptualized as a
question of how to ﬁnd and deport undocumented migrants. Yet it is also
about regulating a large population of long-term undocumented migrants,
including in ways that have a powerful impact on their families, communities,
and on access to key legal institutions. These decisions reshape power
dynamics in far-reaching ways. In the past two decades, immigration
enforcement has rapidly expanded and delegated enforcement discretion to a
host of diﬀerent actors, including both public and private enforcement agents,
without fully appreciating the impact of this approach.
Insights from low-level criminal enforcement show that this type of
enforcement delegation can be costly: it can create law enforcement tradeoﬀs
and lead to system avoidance. While this approach increases the number of
actors who can detect undocumented migrants, it also creates hidden costs.
Attention to the parallels between low-level criminal law enforcement and
immigration enforcement oﬀers a way to begin recognizing and evaluating
the full costs of interior immigration enforcement—costs that may be
rendered invisible by a focus on deportation alone.

228 Lasch et al., supra note 194, at 1755-56 (citing as an example “the 2011 Cook County Ordinance,
which created an absolute requirement that the sheriff decline any detainer request in the absence of a
written agreement with federal officials guaranteeing reimbursement of the costs of compliance”).
229 Kagan, supra note 58, at 127 (“[I]n 2014 several federal district courts . . . found that local
police would be liable for civil rights violations if they heeded ICE detainer requests by keeping
noncitizens in custody when a citizen in the same situation would be released.”).
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